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This paper investigates the institutional causes of China’s Great Famine. It presents two empirical
findings: 1) in 1959, when the famine began, food production was almost three times more than population
subsistence needs; and 2) regions with higher per capita food production that year suffered higher
famine mortality rates, a surprising reversal of a typically negative correlation. A simple model based
on historical institutional details shows that these patterns are consistent with the policy outcomes
in a centrally planned economy in which the government is unable to easily collect and respond to
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Over the course of the twentieth century, over 100 million people perished from famines (Sen,
1981). Famines are not only damaging in the short run, but they reduce the quality of life of
survivors for decades afterwards.1 In this paper, we study the causes of China’s Great Famine,
which began in the winter of 1959-60 and lasted until 1961. In less than three years, the Great
Famine claimed the lives of between seventeen and thirty million people, the highest number
of fatalities of any single historical event.2 Although the famine has received growing attention
from scholars and the general public in recent years, our understanding of the spatial patterns
of famine severity across China and the mechanisms behind it are still very limited.
This study attempts to ﬁll this gap in knowledge with three exercises. First, we present two
empirical ﬁndings that suggest that government policy in food distribution was a main contribu-
tor to the famine. Our results show novel spatial patterns of famine severity and food production
that are diﬃcult to reconcile with conventional explanations of famine. Second, to gain insight
into the nature of the policy outcome that caused the famine, we document the institutional de-
tails of China’s centrally planned food procurement regime and China’s political climate of the
1950s. The qualitative evidence suggests that government policy was inﬂexible, a term we use to
refer to the government’s diﬃculty in collecting and responding to new information. Finally, we
combine the evidence from the ﬁrst two exercises to formulate a theory of famine under central
planning. Our model demonstrates how an inﬂexible procurement system combined with a drop
in aggregate food production can cause a famine with the surprising spatial patterns observed
in the data.
The ﬁrst exercise establishes two empirical ﬁndings. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the 1959 ag-
gregate per capita production of grain, the main component of the Chinese diet, was well above
subsistence needs even though per capita production had fallen by 15% relative to 1958.3 Our
estimates show that aggregate food production in 1959 was at least 205% above the amount
required to avoid mortality. We also ﬁnd that the fall in production, measured as a proportion
to past production, was broadly similar across provinces. More importantly, all provinces pro-
duced more than what was needed to avoid mortality. The second ﬁnding is that regions with
higher per capita food production that year suﬀered higher famine mortality rates, a surprising
reversal of a typically negative correlation in non-famine years. This surprising cross-sectional
relationship is true across all areas and also for a subsample restricted to rural areas.
The main empirical challenge for this study – the same as what all studies of the Chinese
1There are many studies on the eﬀects of the Irish Famine (e.g., O’Rourke, 1994). Also, see O’Grada (2007b)
and Meng and Qian (2009) for overviews of the literature on the eﬀects of famine.
2See e.g., Ashton et al. (1984), Banister (1987), Coale (1981), Peng (1987), and Yao (1999) for estimates of
the total mortality from the famine.
3Grain makes up over 95% of rural diets (Walker, 1984). Urban workers in China during this period also
consumed a grain heavy diet (as they do today). For example, in 1957, an average urban worker in Shanghai,
one of the richest cities at the time, consumed approximate 270 kg of grains but only 15 kg of meat in one year
(Reynolds, 1981).
1famine face – is the questionable quality of the historical data. For political reasons, the gov-
ernment has historically understated the severity of mortality from the famine and overstated
food production. We address this issue in several ways. Our historical analysis uses the most
recently corrected data available and all of our measures are constructed to conservatively bias
against our ﬁndings. In addition, in investigating the spatial patterns of famine, we conduct a
supplementary analysis with retrospectively created proxies for regional famine severity and grain
production. We use regional birth cohort size from the 1990 Population Census as a measure
of famine severity, using the assumption that higher famine severity resulted in lower fertility,
higher infant mortality, and thus, smaller birth cohorts. We use two measures to proxy for grain
production: a time-invariant measure of suitability for grain cultivation based on agro-climatic
conditions and a time-varying proxy measured as annual spring rainfall. Since the retrospective
data is not subject to government mis-reporting and can be disaggregated to the much ﬁner
county-level, our analysis can address the measurement issues and facilitate the interpretation
of the historical province-level analysis.
These empirical results provide several important insights. The fact that enough food was
produced to avoid mortality in 1959 means that the famine could not have been solely caused by
a drop in food production or the factors behind it. The distribution of food consumption must
have played a role in causing the famine. This motivates the central question of our analysis:
What transformed a fall in production into the largest famine in history?
Our second ﬁnding of a positive relationship between regional mortality rates and per capita
food production is surprising in the context of previous studies of famine. Famine studies in
market economies typically predict that regional food production is negatively correlated with
famine severity, the opposite of the pattern we ﬁnd.4 Past studies of the Chinese Famine have
similarly not proposed theories that can adequately explain the geographic distribution of the
famine that we uncover.5 In order to explain this second ﬁnding, we propose a new theory.
Because market mechanisms for food distribution were not operational in centrally-planned
China, government policy in food distribution must have caused the inequality in food consump-
tion which resulted in famine. To understand the factors behind this policy , our second exercise
focuses on documenting qualitative historical evidence on the Chinese grain procurement policy
and the political regime of the time. The Chinese government experienced a number of practical
diﬃculties faced by all centrally-planned governments of poor countries. Neither local leaders
nor peasants had incentives to truthfully report grain production. Limited bureaucratic capacity
and China’s geographic size and poor transportation and communication infrastructure added
to these diﬃculties by making the central collection of new information extremely costly. To
4For example, one of the arguments made by Sen (1981) in his studies of famines in market economies is that
local weather shocks can reduce both local food production and income since incomes in developing countries often
depend on agriculture so that those in aﬀected areas cannot purchase food from unaﬀected regions. Therefore, a
famine can occur even if aggregate food production is high. However, regional food production will be negatively
correlated with famine.
5These studies are reviewed in detail later in the paper.
2adapt to these challenges, the government’s food procurement policy based regional procure-
ment on past regional production, creating a system that could not perfectly adjust to aggregate
food production shocks. Thus, a key feature of the centrally planned procurement system was
inﬂexibility – the government could not easily collect and respond to new information. This
inﬂexibility was likely to have been exacerbated by political tensions within China at that time,
which caused bureaucrats to be especially reluctant to disobey the prescribed rules.
Our ﬁnal exercise investigates the extent to which institutional inﬂexibility can explain the
patterns of the 1959 famine in China. We propose a simple model of food distribution where
food production varies across regions and the government can reallocate food through procure-
ments and subsidies. We assume that mortality is decreasing in food consumption (i.e., regional
mortality rates are decreasing in regional food retention). The key constraint the government
faces is inﬂexibility. Because the government cannot perfectly observe or respond to realized
production, procurement policy cannot perfectly adjust to aggregate shocks. For illustrative
purposes, we focus on the extreme case in which no adjustment is possible. In this case, the
government assigns an inﬂexible region-speciﬁc level of procurement based on expectations of re-
gional production formed from observations of regional endowments for agricultural production
or past production. The model predicts that, under this policy, the government over-procures
from agricultural areas, amplifying the mortality caused by a fall in production. Moreover, with
a production fall that is broadly proportional across regions (which was the case in China in
1959), the procurement policy causes higher over-procurement in more productive rural regions.
Through this mechanism, the model shows that policy inﬂexibility can generate the surprising
pattern of more severe famine in higher grain producing regions even if the central government
has utilitarian preferences and does not explicitly favor particular regions over others.
To illustrate the model, we provide a stylized example in Table 1. There are three regions:
two rural regions (A and B) and a city. Each region has a similar population and therefore
similar subsistence needs. For simplicity, we assume the latter to be 100 tons of food. However,
agricultural endowments diﬀer across regions. Region A is better endowed than region B and
hence produces more food per capita. The city produces no food. As was the case in China,
the government restricts population movements so that individuals from low production regions
cannot move to high production regions. There are two states of the world. In the normal state
which occurs with 80% probability, region A produces 225 tons and region B produces 150 tons.
The second state is caused by an aggregate shock which occurs with 20% probability, production
is 20% lower for each region, reducing production in regions A and B to 180 and 120 tons.
The government expects the aggregate shock to occur with 20% probability. It follows that its
expected production of regions A and B are 216 (225:8+180:2) and 144 (150:8+120:2)
tons, which sum to 360 tons of total production. To illustrate the eﬀect of inﬂexibility as starkly
as possible, we suppose that the government is utilitarian and equalizes expected consumption
across its citizens, giving each of the three regions 120 tons of expected consumption. Due to
inﬂexibility, the government consistently procures the diﬀerence between expected production
3and expected consumption in all states of the world , taking away 96 (216-120) and 24 (144-120)
tons from regions A and B and giving the city a subsidy of 120 tons. Actual consumption is
not constant across states of the world since it equals the diﬀerence between actual production
and procurement. Therefore, in the good state, regions A and B consume 129 (225-96) and 126
(150-24) tons of grain; in the bad state, they consume 84 (180-96) and 96 (120-24) tons. The city
always consumes 120 tons. This example illustrates how inﬂexible policy can reverse the positive
correlation between food production and consumption during an aggregate production shock
that is broadly proportional across regions. This surprising reversal is not only true between
rural and urban regions, but also between the two rural regions.
The main purpose of our simple model is to explain the two empirical facts that we observe
in the data, and by doing so, we provide a novel theory for the causes of famine. The model
provides two additional beneﬁts. First, the model oﬀers a framework for understanding the
interaction of diﬀerent factors in causing famine. It illustrates clearly how the Great Famine
was partly the outcome of an inﬂexible and ambitious food procurement policy combined with a
large fall in aggregate production. Within this framework, additional factors proposed by other
studies (e.g., transport cost, regional favoritism, and local mis-reporting of production) can all
contribute further to famine by making it more severe. Second, the model allows us to assess
the merits of the Chinese procurement policy of ﬁxing quantities relative to an alternative policy
of ﬁxing prices. In an exercise that is similar in spirit to the well-known study by Weitzman
(1974), we show that quantity controls, as those used by the Chinese government during the
1950s, are better than price controls if the rural population is suﬃciently large in size relative to
the urban population and if there is little heterogeneity in the magnitude of productivity shocks
across rural regions.
This paper makes several contributions. First, we build on the seminal work of Sen (1981) in
exploring the causes of famine. Our results are consistent with his thesis showing that unequal
food distribution can cause famine even when aggregate food production levels are suﬃcient for
subsistence. In exploring the causes of famine beyond a drop in aggregate food production, our
work is closely related to a growing number of recent studies (e.g., Shiue, 2004, 2005; Burgess
and Donaldson, 2010).6 We also show that the geographic patterns of famine severity and
food production can be an important clue for understanding the causes of particular famines.
Furthermore, we extend the existing literature by focusing on a non-market economy, illustrating
a precise mechanism through which government policy can generate a famine. This is especially
important since three of the most devastating and controversial famines in history, China’s Great
6Shiue (2004, 2005) explores the role of government policy in determining famine relief during the famines
in Nineteenth Century China. Burgess and Donaldson (2010) study the role of trade and market institutions
in mitigating famines in India. In addition, Shiue (2002) explores the roles of transport costs in China more
generally.
There are many studies on the causes of famine beyond the ones cited in this paper. Most of these focus on
the reduction in food supply as the primary driver of famine – an argument due to the original ideas of Malthus
(1798) – and many have argued that famine was worsened by institutional factors. See O’Grada (2007a), Dreze
(1999), and Ravallion (1997) for overviews of recent economic studies on famines.
4Famine (1959-61), the Ukrainian Famine (1932-33), and the more recent North Korean Famine
(1992-95) have all occurred within non-market economies.7
It is important to point out that, while the nature of the fall in production in 1959 and
many of the institutional details are speciﬁc to the context of the Chinese Famine, neither the
occurrence of large imperfectly anticipated aggregate production shocks nor the constraints that
drive the inﬂexibility of China’s procurement policy are unique to the context of our study.
Because no government can perfectly collect and respond to new information, this constraint of
inﬂexibility can lead to policy failures which amplify the impact of aggregate shocks. This insight
is generalizable beyond the Chinese context, especially to other centrally-planned economies.
Our second contribution is to add to studies on the causes of China’s Great Famine by provid-
ing evidence for two new empirical facts and by developing a theory to explain them.8 Our the-
ory complements existing explanations of the famine by illustrating how previously documented
forces can interact with inﬂexibility to contribute to famine. Like past studies, our results point
to a central planning as the primary cause of the famine. The key diﬀerence between our study
and past studies is our focus on explaining the transformation of the production drop in 1959
into a devastating famine. Previous studies, which we review in Section 2, have typically focused
on the causes of the production drop rather than the distribution of food consumption. Li and
Yang (2005) expand on these studies by arguing that the weakened rural labor supply and loss
of organic inputs (e.g., seeds and organic fertilizers) to human consumption during the ﬁrst and
most severe winter of the famine caused the famine to persist by reducing production in the
subsequent year. Our study abstracts from the production process by taking the production fall
in 1959 as given. We also take as given that the labor supply will be weakened and production in
subsequent years will be reduced once a devastating famine has occurred. Instead, we focus on
the intermediary process and explain how the production fall in 1959 transformed into a famine
that winter, when an apparently plentiful production had just been harvested. In this sense,
our investigation is most closely related to a study by Lin and Yang (2000), which argues that
the famine was caused by the combination of the fall in production and the urban bias in food
distribution. Our empirical analysis expands on theirs by demonstrating extensive inequality
in distribution, not only between urban and rural areas, but also within rural areas. We then
provide a comprehensive theory that explains the observed distributional diﬀerences across all
regions.
7Demographers estimate that approximately 3.2 million died during the Ukrainian famine. The cause of this
famine is a subject of intense scholarly and political debate (e.g., see Vallin et al., 2002 for an overview). In
North Korea, it is commonly believed that 2-3 million individuals, approximately 10% of the total population,
died during this famine (e.g., see Haggard and Noland, 2005; and Demick, 2009). There are very few academic
studies or reliable accounts of details related to this famine.
8The ﬁnding that aggregate production in 1959 should have been suﬃcient for the subsistence of the population
is consistent with many anecdotal accounts and arguably not surprising. However, to the best of our knowledge,
past studies have not attempted to systematically quantify the production “surplus” in 1959. The ﬁnding that
famine was more severe in more productive regions is novel. To the best of our knowledge, it has only been
mentioned in a companion paper on the consequences of famine by Meng and Qian (2009), and as a casual
observation in Jasper Becker’s (1996) book on the Chinese famine.
5Our third contribution is to add to studies on the eﬃciency of central planning and the
trade-oﬀ between quantity and price controls. Our model generally builds oﬀ of arguments
made during the historic Socialist Calculation Debate, when Austrian economists such as Von
Mises (1935) and Hayek (1945) argued that it was practically impossible for central planners
to aggregate necessary information in a timely fashion. Our mechanism for policy outcome due
to inﬂexibility captures this notion.9 More precisely, our theoretical model and counterfactual
exercise are extensions of Weitzman (1974). Our model diﬀers from his in allowing for multiple
producers of varying productivity (i.e., multiple rural regions).10 In this sense, our model is the
ﬁrst to use Weitzman’s framework to understand the impact of ﬁxing quantities on the spatial
distribution of an aggregate economic shock. Our focus on inﬂexibility is also closely related
to recent research on bureaucratic capacity such as studies by Besley and Persson (2009) and
Greif (2008).11 Finally, our study is related to recent work on the role of state capacity in a
government’s response to aggregate shocks (e.g., Cohen and Werker, 2008; Kahn, 2005; and
Zeckhauser, 1996).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background for the
famine. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. Section 5
uses the empirical evidence to conclude that institutions were greatly responsible for the famine
and then documents key features of relevant Chinese institutions. Section 6 introduces a model
of procurement policy which is consistent with the evidence. Section 7 concludes. A lengthy
Appendix includes additional material that is omitted from the main text for purposes of brevity.
2 Historical Background
The early years of the “New” China government, which came to power in 1949, have been the
subject of many scholarly works. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully describe this
period of history; we therefore discuss only issues that are directly related to our study.12 First,
we discuss how the collectivization of farming resulted in the government becoming the only
provider of insurance in case of a shock. Second, we describe the 1959 fall in grain production
and discuss some of its potential causes. Finally, we examine the timeline of the famine – most
of the famine deaths reportedly occurred in the winter of 1959-60, only a few months after the
9For example, also see Heal (1969), Malinvaud (1967) and Weitzman (1970) for more studies on the eﬃciency
of central planning.
10The result that ﬁxing quantities dominates ﬁxing prices if the rural population exceeds the urban population is
a direct application of the more general results in his framework. The result that ﬁxing quantities dominates ﬁxing
prices if the heterogeneity in productivity shocks across the rural population is low follows from our extension.
11Besley and Persson (2009) analyze the implications of administrative capacity on public policy and Greif
(2008) examines government’s dependence on administrators to implement policy choices in a historical context.
12For more detailed historical accounts of the political organization of China, please refer to the scholarly works
of historians such as Fairbank (1986) and Spence (1991). Becker (1996) provides detailed descriptions and a rich
collection of anecdotal accounts of the Great Famine from survivors. Also, a two-volume Chinese publication
commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture (1989) entitled Villages for Thirty Years documents the details of
the social and economic histories of select Chinese villages during the famine era.
6Chinese government procured the fall harvest from rural regions. The speciﬁcs of the grain
procurement policy are described in detail later in Section 5 before we introduce the model.
2.1 New China Reforms 1949-59
The New Communist government of China led by, amongst others, Party Chairman Mao Zedong
(in power 1949-76) designed a centrally-planned economy similar to that of the Soviets. Some
of the goals of the new government were to equalize land access between tenant farmers and
landlords, rapidly industrialize and improve military defense. Historians have not yet fully agreed
on why the Chinese government chose to model its economy based on the Soviets. In our study,
we take the central planning environment of China as given.
In this economy, where approximately 80% of the population worked in agriculture, grain
procurement was seen by the government as the key for development. Most of the grain was
used to fund industrialization, which accounted for 43% of government spending during the
1950s (Eckstein, 1977: pp. 186). This included providing grain to urban populations that
worked in industry and exporting grain (mostly to the U.S.S.R.) in exchange for equipment and
expertise.13 To a lesser extent, grain was also stored in government reserves as insurance against
natural disasters.
Land reforms, which ultimately led to full collectivization by the late 1950s, enabled the
government to control and improve agricultural production and distribution (Twitchett and
Fairbank, 1985; Spence, 1991: pp. 544). They occurred in three phases. The ﬁrst began in 1952
and encouraged farmers to form mutual aid teams of six to nine households. The households
pooled their assets and land. The second phase began around 1954 and was later called “low level
collectivization”. This often required all households within a village to pool together their land
and assets. However, the return that each household was entitled to depended on the amount of
land and assets it contributed to the pool as well as the amount of labor it provided. During this
time, agricultural production increased due to the usage of land strips that were formerly used
to separate private plots and to increased mechanization, which became more productive due to
the pooling of land. During low collectivization, peasants were forced to sell a quota amount
of grain to the government at a set low price and allowed to sell their remaining production
in markets. Approximately 5% of land was left to peasants as private plots from which they
retained all of the production. Many observers have noted with interest that farmers had much
more incentive to work on these private plots such that a disproportionately large amount of
agricultural production came from them. For example, in 1957, these private plots produced
83% of China’s pig and poultry (Spence, 1991: pp. 531-50).
Full collectivization, the third phase that is also often referred to as “high level collectiviza-
tion” was phased in after low level collectivization. The main change was that although the
farmers in each village had contributed land and capital assets for production, they now only
13For example, in 1959, approximately 4.3 million tons were exported to the U.S.S.R., which was approximately
2.3% of total production.
7received food in return for their labor input. Furthermore, while labor was a requirement in order
to receive food and other subsidies, farmers were typically not rewarded for their marginal labor
input. In other words, farmers who contributed to the collective received food and other subsi-
dies for their own consumption. But there was no system for rewarding farmers for production
beyond their subsistence level (Johnson, 1998). This eﬀectively erased private property rights to
land and assets. Private plots were abolished. By 1959, 93% of agricultural land was under high
level collectivization (Spence, 1991: pp. 549-50). At this time, mutual aid teams had ceased to
exist. Markets for private transactions were also banned (Fairbank, 1986: pp. 281-85).
The central government faced two main problems as it increased the scope of collectivization.
The ﬁrst problem was that farmers were not incentivized to produce more than what was needed
for their own consumption, which was guaranteed by the New Communist government. The
collective system addressed this by forcing farmers to work under threats of severe punishment,
constant monitoring and peer pressure. The second problem was that farmers were incentivized
to under-report true production or to hide production. The government attempted to address
this by collectivizing the harvest and storage of grains so that harvest went directly from the
ﬁeld to communal storage depots. Communal kitchens were established so that the collective also
controlled food preparation and consumption.14 There are also accounts that the government
attempted to collect the little grain that farmers could take in their pockets with virulent anti-
hiding campaigns, where ﬁelds and even the ﬂoors of homes were dug up to expose hidden grain,
and where the culprit would typically be publicly humiliated and punished (Becker, 1996: pp.
109).
Chinese peasants, like those in the U.S.S.R. before full collectivization, slaughtered and ate
enormous quantities of meat in anticipation of losing the property rights to their animals, reducing
China’s livestock by half between 1957 and 1958.15 In response to this, the Chinese government
declared that slaughtering animals without permission would be considered a crime against the
state and oﬀenders were threatened with severe punishment. By 1959, the remaining livestock
and draught animals were typically under-nourished and badly tended as peasants no longer had
much interest in caring for them.
For the purposes of our study, these phenomena are important because they mean that
by 1959, the state had eﬀectively destroyed private savings and become the only provider of
insurance against shocks.
2.2 Grain Production
During the late 1950s, most people in China believed that food production would continue to
grow as it had since 1949. From 1949 to 1958, food production grew almost monotonically at
14Collectivizing food preparation was also meant to free female labor from household production so that it
could be shifted into agricultural production.
15See Becker (1996) for comparisons of historical accounts. See Yang (2008) for an economic comparison of the
famines in China and the U.S.S.R.
8approximately 4% per year. This steady growth was partly due to renewed political stability
after decades of conﬂict and eﬃciency gains from early phases of collectivization. New farming
methods introduced during the collectivization period may also have improved output.16 In
general, there was a belief that China was awash with food. For example, in the fall of 1958,
villagers were encouraged to eat as much as they wanted from communal kitchens (Becker, 1996,
pp. 80).
The trends in food growth and the attitude of people towards food are important for under-
standing the broader context of the famine. General optimism undoubtedly played a role in the
mindset of the central government when it set high procurement levels and when local leaders
delivered large quantities of grain for central procurement. We revisit this issue later in Section
5.
In 1959, grain production fell by 15% from the previous year. After harvest, in mid-October
and November, approximately 38% of total production was procured by the central government
(see Li and Yang, 2005).17 Had production in 1959 grown at the same 4% per annum rate as
the previous years (on average), procurement would have been 32% of production, a less severe
increase from the 26% in 1958, and close to the 1954 procurement rate. The majority of famine
deaths occurred in January and February of 1960, two to three months after the grain was
procured (Becker, 1996: pp. 94).
The Chinese government has claimed that the famine was a result of bad weather and low
production in 1959 (Coale, 1981; Yao, 1999; Peng, 1987; Ashton et al., 1984; and Banister, 1987).
However, over time, scholars have estimated the eﬀects of weather on the famine and ﬁnd that
bad can weather can explain at most 14-50% of the famine (Li and Yang, 2005; Kueh, 1995).
Studies conducted during the post-Mao era have also hypothesized that the fall in production
was associated with Great Leap Forward (GLF, 1958-1960) era policies such as labor and acreage
reductions in grain production (e.g., Peng, 1987; Yao, 1999), implementation of radical programs
such as communal dining (e.g., Yang, 1996; Chang and Wen, 1997), reduced work incentives due
to the formation of the people’s communes (Perkins and Yusuf, 1984), and the denial of peasants’
rights to exit from the commune (Lin, 1990).18 Li and Yang (2005) compile province-level panel
16However, some of these methods such as multiple cropping may have been unsustainable in the long run and
ultimately contributed to the fall in production in 1959 (Spence, 1991: pp. 183). For example, collectivized farms
increased the number of crops planted per year. They also followed the Soviets in implementing methods such as
the Lysenko method which prescribed deep sowing of seeds for better production. The results of such methods
are still debated today.
17In our data, which includes production of 27 provinces in 1959 (all except Tibet, Hainan and Sichuan), we
observe a 13% fall in aggregate production. In the Li and Yang (2005) data, which includes 24 provinces, there
is a 15% fall. In this paper, when we refer to production data, we always refer to our data. However, when we
refer to procurement data, we refer to Li and Yang (2005).
18Chang and Wen (1997) also argue that the famine actually began in 1958, which resulted in high mortality
rates beginning in 1958 and then escalated in subsequent years. However, in this paper, we follow convention
and deﬁne the famine to have begun following the harvest of 1959. The fall harvest of 1959 was associated with
a dramatic increase in mortality rates in 1960, which was almost 22 per 1,000, twice as high as the low point for
mortality rates during the 1950s (~10 per 1,000). In contrast, the mortality rates in 1958-59 were moderate at
approximately 11-13 per 1,000 (see Figure 1), and they were only slightly higher than the lowest mortality rates
during the 1950s. Moreover, the data show that the higher mortality rates before 1960 were driven by one or two
9data on grain production and attempt to quantify the impact of each potential factor. They
ﬁnd that in addition to weather, the relevant factors were over-procurement and the diversion
of labor away from agriculture for projects such as rural industrialization during the Great Leap
Forward. In particular, they argue that over-procurement weakened the agricultural labor force
and caused further drops in food production from 1960-61.19
Our study takes both the fall in grain production in 1959 and the lasting eﬀects of famine
as given. Instead, we focus on how the ﬁrst drop in production in 1959 caused the high famine
mortality rates in the subsequent winter.
2.3 The Famine 1959-61
Most accounts agree that the highest rates of mortality occurred in January and February of
1960, two to three months after the 1959 harvest was procured.20 Half of the deaths are believed
to have been of children under ten years of age (Spence, 1991: pp. 583).21 The number of deaths
is staggering, particularly when one considers that relatively little food is needed to stay alive in
the absence of disease and the presence of clean water, two conditions true of rural China after the
massive public health improvements undertaken during the 1950s (Fairbank, 1986: pp. 279).22
The food deﬁcit in rural areas, where most of the mortality occurred, must have been enormous.
Many believe that communal food storage exacerbated the shortage of food in the countryside
because peasants, not realizing the extent of food scarcity after procurement, did not ﬁght the
collective for control over the food supplies so that they could optimize their consumption of
food stores through the winter. Most peasants had little cause for suspicion as most remember a
plentiful harvest and plentiful meals from communal kitchens. To many, it was a surprise when
the food suddenly and completely ran out during the winter months (e.g., Yang, 1996; Chang
and Wen, 1997).
It seems that the Chinese government began to respond to the famine as early as the spring
provinces (e.g., Gansu and Yunnan) (see Appendix Figure FA2).
19See Yang (2008) for a recent review of the studies on the causes of China’s famine. Li and Yang (2005) use
a dynamic model to argue that erroneous expectations of production caused over-procurement in 1959, which in
turn reduced inputs for agricultural production (e.g., labor was weakened, and seeds were consumed by hungry
peasants) in 1960, leading to a further decline in production. They calculate grain retention after procurement
in 1959 to be 223 kg per person and in 1960 to be 212 kg per person. Our study builds on the spirit of theirs by
making the additional argument that estimates for grain retention such as theirs are not actually low enough to
cause mortality. Therefore, for so many to have died, there must have been distributional problems which caused
some to have much less than the national average. See section 4.1.
20Mortality data from the famine is not available at a monthly frequency. Historians and survivors provide
consistent accounts that almost all of the mortality happened during the ﬁrst winter. For a detailed description
see Becker (1996) and Fairbank (1986).
21Younger children may have been more vulnerable to famine for biological or food allocation reasons. They
may have been physically more vulnerable to nutritional deprivation, which for infants could reﬂect a decrease
in the supply or quality of breastmilk from mothers. Alternatively, households may decide to allocate more food
towards adult members who can use their labor to convert these calories into more food consumption for the
household. For similar reasons, the elderly are considered to be more vulnerable in times of shocks.
22The Chinese Famine is similar to the Leningrad and Dutch famines where mortality is mostly due to starvation
rather than succumbing to infectious disease (O’Grada, 2007b).
10of 1960. The government implicitly acknowledged the famine by reducing food rations for urban
areas, but nonetheless, urban areas never experienced extreme famine or mass starvation. The
government also reassigned labor that had once been transferred to cities back to the agricutural
sector in order to supplement the greatly weakened rural labor supply and prevent further falls in
production. However, the number of returned workers was small relative to the demands of the
agriculture sector and organic inputs to production such as seeds and organic fertilizer had been
consumed, severley limiting the productivity of labor. Production in 1960 declined dramatically
from 1959. After the bad harvest of 1960, the government delivered large amounts of grain to
famine stricken areas. There is no detailed or systematic historical account of where exactly
the grain replenishment came from, but presumably, some of the grain came from government
reserves. By observing the large decreases in the government’s investment in industry and mili-
tary expenditures which decreased by 30% from 1959 to 1960 (Gittings, 1967: pp. 309), we can
speculate that much of the grain replenishments also came from what was otherwise designated
for military and industrial purposes. Production slowly recovered in the subsequent years.23
There are two important facts to keep in mind in understanding the chronology of the famine.
First, the communist party rose to power promising to end famines and the Communist party’s
primary stronghold was the rural population. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership
of approximately 5.2 million in 1957 was approximately 70% rural.24 Therefore, we have little
reason to believe that the Chinese government would have had political motivations for desiring
a famine, especially one that struck rural areas. Throughout this period, the party leadership in
China was aware that they could not politically aﬀord to implement a policy that would cause
a famine like what occurred in the U.S.S.R. (Spence, 1991; pp. 575-76). While one may suspect
some government oﬃcials of being callous, the selﬁsh desire of remaining in power would make
it hard to believe that the government intended for the famine to occur.25 The unintentional
aspect of causing the famine is important to keep in mind when we specify the objective function
of the central planner in Section 6.1.
The second fact to keep in mind is that unlike any other famine in history, the Chinese
famine did not result in mass migration. The central and local governments together prevented
the population of famine stricken regions from migrating to other regions in search for food. This
undoubtedly exaggerated mortality rates that resulted from the fall in food production. For our
study, it also means that regional variation in the size of the birth cohort during the famine can
be used as a proxy for regional variation in famine intensity.
23It is diﬃcult to retrospectively account for grain allocation in a rigorous way. Part of the reason is the lack
of data. But the diﬃculty also comes from the fact that historical accounts typically report grain in units of
tons and government expenditures in units of RMB (yuan), and we have not been able to uncover how grain was
valued.
24Approximately, six out of every one thousand rural residents were CCP members.
25This is slightly diﬀerent from the situation of the Soviet Ukrainian famine. Soviet Communist party mem-
bership was approximately 70% urban and in the case of the Ukrainian Famine (1932-33), the famine occurred in
a region that was historically not aligned with the Stalin-led government.
113 Data
The empirical analysis attempts to establish the geographic and temporal patterns of food pro-
duction and famine severity. The main empirical challenge is to address issues regarding mea-
surement error in the historical data on production and mortality. As in previous studies on the
Chinese Famine, we face the diﬃculty that the Chinese government systematically over-reported
production and under-reported mortality to understate the failures of government policy and
famine severity. We employ a variety of methods to address this problem. The most important
one is the use of retrospectively constructed proxies of famine severity and grain production in a
supplementary analysis to check the robustness of the ﬁndings regarding the spatial distribution
of famine severity. The results from using these proxies, which are not subject to systematic
government mis-reporting, indicates whether our main results from using the historical data are
driven by measurement error. The following discussion provides a detailed description of each
data source and highlights important facts from the descriptive data.
3.1 Historical Data
In the historical analysis, we use historical data on production, mortality rates, and population.
These data have been retrospectively corrected by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to
account for mis-reporting or missing data from past contemporaneous reports. We use the most
conservative esimates of production and mortality of which we are aware. This data reports
similar or lower production and similar or higher mortality than previous comparable studies.
More discussion on the corrections and comparisons with other data is included in the Data
Appendix.
The annual province-level historical data on grain production, population and mortality rates
are from the Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 years of New China (CSDM50)
published by the China Statistical Press in 1999. In our study, we use data from all available
years, 1949-98. There are two main issues that arise in our analysis of this historical series.
The ﬁrst issue regards accuracy: for political reasons, the government has historically overstated
production. Such a bias would lead us to incorrectly overestimate available food per capita in
1959.26 The second issue regards the completeness of the province-level data: several provinces
report missing values for historical production data. NBS oﬃcials suggest that these are typically
the provinces for which they could not make accurate revisions, so our province level data includes
27 provinces.27
26This can cause our calculations of aggregate food needs and production in 1959 to show that there was
enough food even if actual production was below subsistence needs. Therefore, when we interpret the estimated
production surplus we will not interpret the level of surplus literally. Rather, we will argue that the magnitude
of the surplus is so large, that it is highly implausible that it is generated only by over-reporting. See Section 4.1
for more discussion.
27Our province analysis excludes Sichuan, Tibet and Hainan. Each of these provinces were missing either
mortality or production data for 1959. Another issue is that mortality data is not available for many provinces
before 1954. For example, in 1949, data on mortality is only available for 15 of the 27 provinces. This is not
12The corrected population data takes into account corrected mortality data and fertility
changes observed in famine year birth cohort sizes from later population censuses. From dis-
cussions with oﬃcial statisticians, we believe that the population data may still understate
population losses from the famine, but this inaccuracy should not aﬀect our estimates for food
requirements in 1959, since famine deaths mostly occurred in 1960.28 Since only total population
is reported, we use the sex and age distribution from Coale (1981), which is based on the 1954
Population Census, to calculate caloric needs. We assume that in each year, the population for
each province had the same sex and age distribution as the national level data in 1954. This
should be a reasonable estimate for the years close before and after 1954, which is the focus of
our study.29
We plot average mortality rates over time in Figure 1. It shows that over the ﬁfty years of
the New Communist regime, there was a strong secular trend of declining mortality such that
average mortality rates fell from approximately ﬁfteen per 1,000 to approximately ﬁve per 1,000.
The data show that this decline was not strictly monotonic – there were occasional mortality
increases of up to 10% relative to the previous year’s rates (e.g., in 1964, 1972, 1990). However,
none of these increases are close in magnitude to what occurred in 1960, when mortality rates
almost doubled from approximately 11 per 1,000 in 1958 to approximately 22 per 1,000 in 1960.
These data are consistent with historical accounts which assign the highest mortality rates to
January and February of 1960. Mortality rates return to trend in 1962.
Of the 27 provinces in our sample, each has approximately 29 million people in a given year,
approximately 86% of provinces experienced higher mortality rates in 1960 than in previous years
(1954-57). When one compares 1954-57 and 1959, one sees that average mortality essentially
doubled in the latter year from 9 to 22 deaths per 1,000 people. At this same time, agricultural
production fell. In 1959, average per capita production was approximately 254 kg, only 83%
of the sample average during 1954-57. Additionally, 96% of the provinces experienced a fall in
production in 1959 relative to 1954-57. Xinjiang, an autonomous province in the northwestern
corner of China, was the only province that did not experience such a fall in production. See
Appendix Table A1 Panel A for descriptive statistics of the province-level data.
The descriptive statistics provide several additional facts about the fall in production in 1959
surprising as the NBS was being constructed at the time and the amount of statistics it was able to gather was
increasing over these early years. We are particularly careful to check that the selection of provinces do not aﬀect
our results by repeating all of our estimates on a restricted sample where the years 1949-1953 are omitted for all
provinces.
28For the years 1960 and 1961, such understatement would cause us to overestimate population food need
and overestimate any aggregate food shortages. Therefore, it would bias against our ﬁnding that there was no
shortage.
29For years after the famine began, this becomes increasingly inaccurate, especially since the famine killed
disproportionately more young children and elderly. See Coale (1981) for details on the quality, collection, and
subsequent corrections of this data. Assuming that each province has the same age and sex distribution as the
1954 national average may cause us to over-state caloric needs for provinces that were experiencing positive growth
in fertility or life expectancy as these provinces will have a larger share of young children and elderly individuals,
who require less calories. By the same logic, this assumption may cause us to understate population food needs
that are experiencing declines in fertility and life expectancy.
13that are important for developing our model later in the paper. First, per capita production in
1959 was greater for regions that produced more in the past; the correlation coeﬃcient between
log production per capita in 1959 and log production per capita in 1958 is 0.97. Second, the
fall in production was broadly uniform across regions when measured as a proportion to past
regional production. This means that the spatial patterns of famine cannot be due to larger per-
centage drops in production in regions that historically produced more.30 If anything, the data
suggest that regions with higher past production experienced slightly smaller drops in produc-
tion.31 Nevertheless, the percentage drops in production across regions were similar enough that
historically higher producing regions experienced larger absolute falls in per capita production
in 1959.
3.2 Retrospective Data
In the supplementary analysis, we use retrospectively calculated regional birth cohort size as a
proxy for famine severity and two alternative proxies for production: a time-invariant measure
of suitability for grain production based on geography and climate and a time-varying measure
of historical weather conditions.
For famine severity, we use birth cohort size from the 1990 Population Census. A smaller
birth cohort size during famine years reﬂects a more intense famine. This can be seen from the
high degree of correlation between birth cohort size and mortality rates across provinces. For
1959-60, this correlation is -0.65.32 The key advantage of this alternative measure is that it
is not subject to systematic mis-reporting by the government. Additionally, this proxy allows
us to disaggregate the data to the county-level and capture much more of the variation in
famine. Furthermore, we can split the data into agricultural and non-agricultural households.
While non-agricultural households typically live in cities and towns, they are sometimes in the
same county as rural households, which typically live in surrounding villages. Distinguishing
30One could suspect that regions that produced more on average were under more pressure to increase production
and thereby were more likely to resort to cultivation methods that increased production in the short run but hurt
production in the long run. Alternatively, one could wonder whether GLF policies diverted more labor away from
agriculture in areas that were historically more productive and therefore caused larger percentage falls in these
regions. The data show that this is not the case.
31The correlation between the percentage change in per capita grain production between 1958 and 1959 and log
per capita production in 1958 is positive, but small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant (i.e., the correlation
is 0.13).
32To visually illustrate this correlation, we aggregate cohort size to the province level and plot province level
mortality rates (Figure A2A) and birth cohort sizes (Figure A2B) over time for each province. A comparison
shows that for each province that exhibits a spike in mortality in 1960, there is a corresponding drop in cohort
size. Moreover, there are many provinces which do not show an increase in mortality but which show a drop in
fertility (e.g., Guangdong). This is consistent with the belief that cohort size is a more sensitive measure than
mortality (e.g., when a famine occurs, victims will forego fertility before allowing a living person to starve to
death).
Note that mortality and survival rates are both proxies for famine severity. One cannot retrospectively back
out true mortality rates from the cohort size data. This is because we do not know the fertility rates in the years
leading up to the famine, and more importantly, we cannot observe those who were elderly at the time of the
famine in the retrospective data.
14these two household types is interesting because they faced very diﬀerent policies in the Chinese
grain distribution system, which procured grain from agricultural households and provided non-
agricultural households with food subsidies. These categories were ﬁrst assigned during the 1950s
and transitioning from one to the other is diﬃcult. A third advantage of our proxy is that birth
cohort size is likely a more sensitive measure of famine than mortality, since famine victims
presumably forego fertility before allowing living family members to die of starvation. Finally,
famine birth cohort size data exists for all thirty provinces, allowing us to expand the geographic
scope of our analysis to cover the entire country. See the Appendix for more discussion on the
birth cohort size data.
Our main proxy for historical production at the county-level is local suitability for grain
cultivation as assessed by an agro-climatic model constructed by the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO). This measure of suitability is based purely on the biophysical environment
of a region and is not inﬂuenced by which crops are actually adopted in an area. Factors that
are easily aﬀected by human actions, such as soil pH, are not parameters in this model. The
suitability measure at the county-level is the fraction of grids within a county that is suitable, a
measure we use for the sake of computational ease. See the Appendix for more details.
After matching cohort size data and suitability data at the county level, we form two county-
level samples, which are each a balanced panel of birth cohorts for 18 birth years (1949-66). One
sample is comprised of agricultural households and the other is comprised of non-agricultural
households. We set the end date of both samples to 1966 to avoid confounding factors that could
have inﬂuenced fertility when the Cultural Revolution began.33
Agricultural households have approximately 5,266 individuals per cohort on average in each
county. Famine cohorts are smaller on average, comprising of approximately 3,508 individuals,
71% of the size of cohorts born prior to the famine (1954-57). If we use this ratio being below
one to indicate whether there was a famine, then 89% of the counties in our sample experienced
the famine to some extent. On average, 13% of the land in counties with agricultural households
is suitable for cultivation of rice and wheat according to our deﬁnition. The patterns for non-
agricultural households are similar. However, the diﬀerence between famine cohort sizes and
pre-famine cohort sizes is smaller in non-agricultural households than for agricultural households.
Also, non-agricultural households typically lived in agriculturally richer areas, where 20% of the
land is suitable for cultivation. (See Appendix Table A1 Panel B for descriptive statistics in the
retrospective county-level sample).
To observe aggregate cohort size over time, we aggregate county-level data to the national
level and plot the number of people living from each birth year for agricultural and non-
33Fertility is a much more sensitive measure than mortality because parents are more likely to forgo having
children before allowing living members to die. This is relevant during the late 1960s and 1970s in China as
there were many events such as the Cultural Revolution or the beginning of family planning policies (in the early
1970s) which may have delayed fertility but not have had large aﬀects on mortality. Our results are robust to the
inclusion of later birth cohorts. These results are not presented for the sake of brevity. They are available upon
request.
15agricultural households in Figure 2. Both agricultural and non-agricultural households experi-
enced a decrease in cohort size close to the famine years, though the drop is much more dramatic
for the agricultural population. The drop in cohort size for those born immediately before the
famine reﬂects the mortality of young children during the crisis. The more severe drop for the
famine birth cohort (1959-61) reﬂects an increase in infant mortality and a dramatic decrease in
fertility. In the ﬁgure, we plot a projected linear trend for agricultural households and show that
there is a positive linear trend in cohort sizes for those born in the mid-1950s and before. For
the years right before and during the famine, a time period indicated by the vertical lines, cohort
sizes are well below trend, though they return to trend after 1961 when the famine ends.34
Using suitability for grain cultivation to proxy for grain production has both advantages and
disadvantages. The main advantage is that the meausure is not subject to government reporting
error. The key disadvantage is that suitability may not be positively correlated with actual
production every year. However, the high autocorrelation in province level production suggests
that this problem is unlikely to be a big concern.
To address this issue quantitatively, we use historical weather conditions as an alternative
time-varying proxy for historical production. The historical weather data is reported by scien-
tiﬁc weather stations of the People’s Republic of China and includes monthly precipitation and
temperature for each station. These data have only recently become available to researchers, and
to the best of our knowledge, it was collected and solely used by government meteorologists. Ac-
cordingly, there are no accounts of manipulation for these data. Because the sample for weather
data is restricted in size, we focus on the results using suitability for grain cultivation and refer
to the results from using weather data mainly as a robustness check. See the Appendix for more
details on these data.
4 Empirical Results
This section presents two empirical ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that food production in 1959 was
signiﬁcantly above what was needed to avert famine-induced mortality. Second, we ﬁnd that rural
regions that produced more food per capita in 1959 suﬀered higher mortality during the famine,
reversing the normally negative correlation between per capita food production and mortality.
4.1 National Grain Production and Subsistence in 1959
In this section, we discuss our ﬁrst ﬁnding that food production in 1959 exceeded per capita sub-
sistence needs by comparing the historical estimates of national food production to two bench-
marks for caloric needs. The two benchmarks distinguish between the caloric requirements for
preventing a decrease in labor productivity from the requirements for preventing mortality. Be-
34Using the ratio of famine cohort size to pre- or post-famine cohort size as a proxy for famine severity, we ﬁnd
that there is substantial cross-sectional variation in famine intensity. This can be seen in a histogram of the ratio
of famine cohort size to pre-famine cohort size for agricultural populations in Appendix Figure A3.
16cause the majority of famine mortality occurred in the winter following the harvest of 1959, we
focus on the level of production in 1959. We do not consider the additional fall in production in
1960 which occurred after a large proportion of the rural workers were already starving or dead.
While we examine these two benchmarks for interest, the lower benchmark is more relevant for
our study because we are interested in why people died in the winter of 1959-60, when the pro-
duction from 1959 had already been harvested (i.e., people did not need to work to produce more
food to stay alive). Note that a priori, it would not be surprising to ﬁnd that production in 1959
did not fall below the needs for preventing mortality, since aggregate production per capita in
1959 only dropped to the same level as in 1949-1951, a period in which there was no famine.35
To calculate population caloric needs, we use China’s 1954 population age and sex distribution
as reported by Coale (1981). Caloric requirements for working and healthy child development are
calculated from a model published by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Our
calculation shows that the average per capita population caloric need for productive agricultural
laborers and normal child development is 1,871 calories per day and that the average need to
stay alive is approximately 804 calories per day. The details behind this calculation are described
in the Appendix.
To calculate the total population’s caloric needs in terms of grain, we use the calculated per
capita caloric needs together with the annual sum of historical population for the 27 provinces
of our sample. The Ministry of Health and Hygiene of China estimates that one kilogram of
grain in the mix and form as consumed by the average Chinese worker provides 3,587 calories.
We assume that individuals subsist solely on grain and that each individual consumes the same
amount every day of the year. This leads to the conclusion that, with a diet of 1,870 calories
per day, per capita grain needs are 190 (365 1870
3587) kg per year. Using this ﬁgure, we determine
the needs of the population and calculate the deﬁcit in production as the diﬀerence between
production and need. We repeat the same exercise for the lower benchmark of caloric need and
ﬁnd that 82 (365 804
3587) kg of grain per capita would have prevented mortality.
The estimated population food need and food production over time from our sample of 27
provinces are plotted in Figure 3 (and shown in Appendix Table A3). In 1959, production was far
greater than the baseline subsistence level. Speciﬁcally, there was a 99 million ton surplus above
the 48 million tons required. Production was in surplus even relative to the higher benchmark
of food required for high labor productivity; production exceeded this level by 36 million tons.
Figure 3 illustrates several interesting facts. First, the fall in production by itself could
not have caused the famine in 1959. Production was almost three times as much as what was
needed to keep the entire population alive. While we do not interpret these calculated surplus
levels literally, it is important to note that the magnitude of the surpluses suggests that it is
highly unlikely for over-reporting of production to undermine our argument that there was no
35When comparing the caloric needs between our two benchmarks, one should also note that the relationship
between calories consumed and work capacity is potentially highly non-linear, as suggested by the nutritonal
poverty trap theory (Das Gupta and Ray, 1986). This does not play an important role for our study since we will
argue that production in 1959 was in excess of both benchmarks.
17aggregate deﬁcit in food. One would need to be believe that our data, the most conservative data
available, still exaggerates production by 205% (99
48 100) to think that aggregate production was
too little to prevent mortality in 1959. This exercise also shows that the fall in production in
1959 was the largest drop experienced by the new government since coming to power in 1949.
This observation is consistent with historical accounts of the general expectation of continued
growth in food production and the widely held belief that the production fall in 1959 was largely
unanticipated by central and local leaders.
To be conservative, we intentionally construct our calculations for caloric needs to bias us
against ﬁnding that food production was suﬃcient, and we do so in three ways. First, we
assume that the entire adult population worked as laborers in agriculture, whereas in reality,
approximately 20% of the population in 1959 worked in less physically intensive non-agricultural
jobs. Second, we proxy for the number of calories needed to stay alive with the conventional
benchmark for the number of calories needed to do“some” work (e.g., see Das Gupta and Ray,
1986). We use this measure because there is little consensus on the minimum caloric consumption
necessary for staying alive. Finally, post-World War II fertility rates were very high, so a larger
fraction of the population consisted of children in 1959 relative to 1954. Since children need
fewer calories than adults, we will overstate caloric needs. See the Appendix for more details on
the calculation.36 The fact that we are overstating caloric needs is consistent with the fact that
Figure 3 shows that 1949-50 food production as slightly below population needs according to the
higher benchmark, but there are no accounts of famine or starvation in those years.
In interpreting these results, several concerns should be considered. First, one could raise the
concern of whether the national level is the appropriate level of aggregation. China is a large
country in terms of geographic size. If food is typically redistributed regionally, it may be more
reasonable to think of the province as the appropriate level of aggregation. Therefore, we repeat
this exercise for each province. We ﬁnd that the result holds for the province level. All provinces
produced more than what was needed to avoid mortality, and only the three province-level
municipalities produced less than what was needed for a healthy labor force and normal child
development. Ironically, the mortality rates for these regions were amongst the lowest during
the famine. (See the Appendix for more discussion and Appendix Table A4 for province level
production and caloric needs in 1959).37 Second, one may worry that our estimates of average
36In addition, the aggregate statistics could also overstate food deﬁcit in 1959 because Sichuan, Hainan and
Tibet are omitted from our sample of 27 provinces. The omission of Sichuan is likely to cause us to understate
per capita production and overstate the food deﬁcit. On average, Sichuan is the largest grain producer in China
and the 6th largest in per capita terms. On average, this one province accounts for more than 9% of national
production. (Tibet and Hainan typically produce just enough food for their own subsistence. Therefore, their
omission should not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on our estimates).
37For this result, it is important to recall that by assuming that all provinces have the same demographic
composition, we overestimate food needs in provinces with positive growth in fertility and life expectancy; the
higher the growth, the more we overestimate. We can reasonably infer that all provinces in our sample experienced
positive growth in fertility and life expectancy from the fact that our data shows that all provinces experienced
positive growth in population before 1959. This means that we are overestimating food needs for the national
population.
18caloric needs understate the caloric requirement during winter conditions, when the human body
expends more energy to combat exposure to cold temperatures. However, peasants typically
work less during the winter, in between fall harvest and spring sowing, and related evidence from
nutritional studies on caloric requirements during winter conditions (e.g., Milan and Rodahl,
1961) all suggest that our result that enough food was produced to prevent mortality in 1959
is unlikely to be undermined by the additional caloric requirements necessary to survive winter
conditions.38
In summary, the estimates presented in this section show that China produced more than
enough food to avoid famine deaths in 1959 at the national and at the provincial level.
4.2 Regional Grain Production and Famine in 1959
4.2.1 Historical Data
To investigate the cross-sectional relationship between per capita production and mortality rates
more systematically, we estimate the cross-sectional correlation between the per capita produc-
tion in province p and year t and the mortality rate in that province the following year. To allow
the eﬀect to diﬀer for the famine years, we introduce the interaction term of grain production
and a dummy variable for 1959, when aggregate production fell. Note that because mortality
is recorded annually and the majority of deaths are believed to have occurred during the early
months of 1960, we estimate the relationship between production in a given year and mortality
in the following year. For this exercise, we transform the reported mortality rate data into the
number of deaths in province p and year t by multiplying it by total provincial population in
province p and year t.39 The estimated equation is:
38There is no systematic evidence on caloric requirements for staying alive, not to mention evidence on caloric
requirements across diﬀerent physical environments. However, based on related evidence, we believe that winter
conditions are unlikely to have caused caloric requirements to be so high as to create an aggregate food deﬁcit in
1959. For example, in the Minnesota Starvation Experiments, where adult males were subject to mild starvation
and given diets of approximately 1,560 calories per day for six months and subject to harsh temperature drops
(to simulate war conditions), there were no deaths due to the temperature drops (Keys, 1950). Our benchmark
for caloric need for heavy labor is actually 17% above the caloric provision in this experiment, which suggests
that our estimates are probably conservative even taking winter conditions into account. In a study of caloric
needs for scientists working in Antarctica (Milan and Rodahl, 1961), it was found that a 30% increase in caloric
intake was more than enough for the winter months which dropped to -70 degrees Fahrenheit (i.e., the scientists
performed the same amount of labor in the winter and gained weight with this diet). From our estimates, one can
clearly see that a 30% increase from the lower benchmark for caloric need for staying alive is still far from grain
production levels in 1959. Moreover, winters in China are mild relative to Antarctica. For example, in Anhui, a
province that experienced one of the highest famine mortality rates, average winter temperatures are around 59
degrees Fahrenheit.
39Oﬃcial documentation of the CSDM50 states that mortality rate is calculated as the total number of deaths in
a year measured at the end of the year divided by the population as measured during the middle of the year. This
suggests that the correct measure of death is Deatht = MortalityRatet TotPopt. However, one may reasonably
doubt the Chinese government’s ability to collect population data during the middle of 1960, and think that
instead they may have used the population from 1959 as the denominator for calculating mortality rates such
that Deatht = MortalityRatet TotPopt 1. The results presented in this paper are from using the latter method.
However, the results are similar between the two diﬀerent methods of normalization. Those from using the ﬁrst
method are reported in the Appendix Table A5.
19lnDeathsp;t+1 = a(lnGrainp;t FamineDummyt)+b lnGrainp;t (1)
+glnTotPopp;t +dt +ep;t
The log of the number of deaths in province p and year t+1 is a function of: the interaction
between log grain production in province p in year t, lnGrainpt, and a dummy variable for the
year 1959, FamineDummyt; the main eﬀect for log grain production; the log total population of a
province p in year t, lnTotPoppt; and, year ﬁxed eﬀects, dt. More populous provinces will naturally
have more deaths and more grain production, and controlling for total population reﬂects the
fact that we care about per capita grain production and deaths. This is a more ﬂexible way
of normalizing than dividing each measure with the total population.40 In this estimation, b
measures the average correlation between per capita grain production and mortality rates for
1949-1958 and 1960-1997. If grain production is negatively correlated with death, then ˆ b < 0.
a reﬂects the marginal correlation in 1959. The average relationship between grain production
and mortality in 1959 is the sum of the two coeﬃcients, a +b.
The estimated results are presented in Table 2. For each coeﬃcient, we present the unadjusted
and robust standard errors. The small number of provinces means that we cannot cluster the
standard errors at the province level without being vulnerable to small sample bias. Column
(1) shows the estimates using all 27 provinces of our sample. It shows that the correlation
between grain production and mortality is negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant. However,
the interaction term for grain production and the 1959 dummy variable is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In column (2), we omit the autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Guangxi,
Ningxia, Neimeng and Qinghai, as these regions had a much larger share of ethnic minorities
and were often subject to diﬀerent policies from the provinces which contained almost exclusively
Han Chinese.41 When we exclude these provinces, the results become more precisely estimated.
The interaction term between grain production and the 1959 dummy remains large, positive,
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The main eﬀect of grain production is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcients show that the average elasticity
between per capita grain production and mortality rate is approximately -0.06 in normal years,
but in 1959, the elasticity is increased by 0.256. To see the total eﬀect in 1959 and its statistical
signiﬁcance, we sum these two coeﬃcients. The sum and the p-value using the two diﬀerent
methods of computing standard errors are reported at the bottom of the table. Here, we see that
40Diﬀerent ways of normalization do not change the results. For brevity, we only report the more ﬂexible
method in this paper. The alternative results are available upon request.
41For example, in Tibet, there was a large uprising against the Chinese government in 1958. Subsequently, the
Chinese government imposed a particular set of policies for the province of Tibet and all Tibetan autonomous
regions in the neighboring provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu. Generally, autonomous regions face diﬀerent
ﬁscal policies (e.g., food and revenue redistribution) and are organized diﬀerently from the central government.
In later years, ethnic minorities also faced diﬀerent fertility control policies from the Han Chinese population.
20the correlation is reversed in 1959. A 1% increase in grain production in 1959 is correlated with
a 0.194% increase in mortality. The estimated p-values show that this joint statistic is highly
statistically signiﬁcant.
In column (3), we add a control for government expenditure on health and education, which
we use to proxy for public goods expenditure.42 This controls for potential confounding factors
such as the way in which regional governments responded to the famine. For example, gov-
ernments in regions that produce less food on average may be more prepared for famine and
therefore respond to famine with higher spending on public health. If this is the case, then the
positive correlation between production and mortality in 1959 would reﬂect diﬀerences in public
expenditures as opposed to diﬀerences in food consumption. The results in column (3) suggest
that this is probably not the case, as our estimates are very robust to this additional control.
Next, we control for province-speciﬁc time trends, which addresses the concern that more
productive regions may have experienced diﬀerent mortality trends from regions that produce less
on average. For example, more productive regions may have invested more in public health, which
could lower mortality rates on average and exaggerate the famine versus non-famine diﬀerence
in mortality rates. Column (4) shows that our estimates are robust to this rigorous control.
Finally, we address the problem that we lack mortality data for many provinces before 1954.
Our sample is only a balanced panel of 27 provinces from 1954-98. To check that the selection
of the provinces that reported data in the previous years do not drive our results, we re-estimate
the same equation on a restricted sample to the years 1954-98. The estimates are very robust.
One concern about the estimates from equation (1) is that we are not capturing diﬀerences
that are speciﬁc to the famine years. For example, one could worry that the relationship between
grain production and mortality changes over time for completely spurious reasons. Alternatively,
the positive correlation we detect in 1959 could simply be capturing GLF policies, which were in
place during 1957-60. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that spurious changes
occurred, we can examine the data more carefully to see whether the relationship between grain
production and mortality is positive in other years. We estimate the correlation between grain





at(lnGrainp;t YearDummyt=t)+glnTotPopp;t +dt +ep;t, (2)
where YearDummyt=t equals 1 if t = t and equals 0 otherwise. This speciﬁcation is similar to
equation (1). The diﬀerence is that we now interact grain production with a dummy variable
for each year, and because we have an interaction term for each year in the sample, we drop
the main eﬀect of grain production. Therefore, the average correlation between grain produced
in a province and mortality is at for each year t. As before, we normalize by total population
by controlling for that term on the right hand side. To increase precision, we use the restricted
sample where we omit autonomous regions. The vector of estimated ˆ a’s and their 95% conﬁdence
42These data are reported in the CSDM50.
21intervals are plotted in Figure 4A. They are shown in Appendix Table A6. As with the earlier
estimates, we present both unadjusted and robust standard errors. The ﬁgure shows clearly that
relative to other years, the relationship between grain production and mortality spikes upwards in
1959. The time path of the correlation between grain production and mortality looks extremely
similar to the time path of the raw data on mortality rates plotted in Figure 1. This means
that the ﬁnding from Table 2 that the relationship between grain production and mortality
changes in 1959 is speciﬁc to that year and not confounded by spurious changes unrelated to
the production fall in 1959. Similarly, it is equally unlikely that the sharp positive relationship
between production and mortality we observe in 1959 is simply an outcome of general GLF
(1958-61) policies, which were in place for at least three years other than 1959.
In summary, the historical data illustrate a stark cross-sectional pattern between famine
severity and food production in 1959: the normally negative correlation reverses to be positive in
1959. There are several caveats to interpreting this correlation. First, there are the concerns over
data quality which we discussed in Section 3. Second, the results in this section do not identify
whether the patterns are solely driven by urban-rural diﬀerences or if they also exist across rural
households. Third, the province-level results could reﬂect diﬀerences in regional responses to the
production shortfall in 1959. We address these issues in the next section.
4.2.2 Retrospective Data
In this section, we conduct a similar empirical exercise with retrospective measures of famine
severity, using regional birth cohort size from the 1990 Population Census and two proxies for
grain production: the regional suitability for cultivating rice or wheat as predicted by time-
invariant natural conditions, and annual regional spring precipitation. This supplementary anal-
ysis is a robustness check for the historic province-level analysis in that it allows us to address
the caveats associated with interpreting the results from the previous section.
We estimate the cross-sectional correlation between log birth cohort size and suitability for
grain production using the following equation:
lnCohortSizect = a(Suitabilityct FamineDummyt)+bSuitabilityct + (3)
gAvglnCohortSizec+dt +ect (4)
Log birth cohort size for birth county c in birth year t is a function of: the interaction term
between the predicted suitability for county c for cultivating grain, Suitabilityc, and a dummy
variable indicating whether a cohort was born during 1959-61, FamineDummyt; the main eﬀect
of suitability for grain cultivation; the average of the log of cohort size for each county c; and
birth year ﬁxed eﬀects, dt. This equation is conceptually similar to equation (1), except that we
use log birth cohort size as the dependent variable, have a time-invariant proxy for production,
22and control for the average of the log of each county’s birth cohort size on the right hand side.
Note that there is no historical data for county-level population for most counties in China.
Hence, controlling for average log county birth cohort size is a proxy for controlling for county
population, which allows us to interpret the estimated coeﬃcients in per capita terms.43 The
standard errors are clustered at the county level.
The average correlation between suitability and birth cohort size is reﬂected by b. One would
expect that more suitable regions would typically have larger birth cohort sizes (from higher
fertility rates or child survival rates) such that b > 0. a is the marginal correlation between
suitability and cohort size for those born during the famine such that the average correlation
between suitability and cohort size for the famine cohorts is reﬂected by the sum of the two
coeﬃcients, a +b.
Table 3 columns (1)-(4) present the estimates for agricultural households. Column (1) uses
a full sample of all provinces. It shows that grain suitability is on average positively correlated
with cohort size. The elasticity between per capita land suitable for grain production and per
capita birth cohort size is approximately 0.048 for birth cohorts on average. The estimate
for the interaction term shows the marginal correlation for those born during famine years; it
is negative. Both of the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As with the
historical estimates, the average correlation between grain suitability and cohort size for those
born during the famine is the sum of the two coeﬃcients presented at the bottom of the table.
It is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. For those born during the famine, the usual positive
relationship between suitability for grain cultivation and cohort size is reversed such that the
elasticity between per capita land suitable for grain production and per capita birth cohort size is
-0.21. In columns (2)-(4), we omit the autonomous provinces Tibet, Xinjiang, Neimeng, Ningxia,
Guangxi and Qinghai. Column (2) shows that this changes our estimates very little. In column
(3), we add province-speciﬁc time trends as additional controls to address the possibility that
fertility or child mortality trends may have diﬀered between provinces. The estimates are again
very robust. In column (4), we add the most rigorous set of controls, province-year-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects. This controls for any changes across provinces and over time in a fully ﬂexible manner.
For example, if certain provincial governments implemented particular policies in response to
the famine, this regression controls for these policies where we compare the diﬀerences across
counties within years. As before, the estimates change little in magnitude. All of the estimates
presented in columns (2)-(4) are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Next, we repeat the same estimation on a sample of non-agricultural households. The non-
agricultural sample is smaller because there are many counties that contain only agricultural
households. The estimated coeﬃcients are much smaller in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. Towards the bottom of the table, we see that the sum of the coeﬃcients are all very small
in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant. These estimates suggest that on average, the cohort
43The fact that the control is averaged over birth years and time invariant for each county means that the
coeﬃcients of interest are identical to those in a speciﬁcation which controls for county ﬁxed eﬀects.
23sizes of urban households are not correlated with local grain production.
For consistency with the historical analysis, we estimate the correlation between grain suit-
ability and cohort size for each birth year. This exercise is analogous to the yearly estimates





at (Suitabilityt YearDummyt=t)+gAvglnCohortSizec+dt +ect; (5)
where YearDummyt=t equals 1 if t =t and equals 0 otherwise. The log cohort size of individuals
born in year t in county c is a function of: the interaction terms between the fraction of land
that is suitable for grain production in county c and dummy variables for each year; the average
of log birth cohort size in a county and birth year ﬁxed eﬀects. All standard errors are clustered
at the county level. The inclusion of year ﬁxed eﬀects controls for secular changes in fertility and
mortality that may aﬀect cohort sizes. The inclusion of average log cohort size normalizes the
outcome variable and suitability by population and is identical to controlling for county ﬁxed
eﬀects.
For brevity, we focus our discussion on the estimates for agricultural households, which are
presented in Appendix Table A7 column (1). They and their 95% conﬁdence intervals are plotted
in Figure 4B. This ﬁgure demonstrates that relative to cohorts born far before the famine, cohort
sizes for those born right before the famine (and were very young when the famine began) and
those born during the famine are negatively correlated with grain suitability. Interestingly, the
pattern in the correlation between suitability and cohort size across birth years is very similar to
the pattern of birth cohort sizes across birth years that we observe in the raw data in Figure 2.
This retrospective analysis supports the earlier historical analysis. Under the assumption
that regions which produce more grain on average also produced more in 1959, the ﬁndings show
that there is a reversal in the relationship between per capita production and survival rate for
the famine birth cohort. However, if 1959 grain production was actually lower for counties that
produce more on average relative to those that produce less, then the retrospective analysis using
the grain suitability proxy becomes diﬃcult to interpret. Since the historical province level data
show a very high degree of autocorrelation between per capita production in 1958 and 1959, our
prior is that there is probably also high autocorrelation in county level production in those years.
However, without any historical county level production data, we need an alternative method of
verifying this assumption.
We address this diﬃculty by re-estimating equation (3) using an alternative time-varying
proxy for food production: the log of average precipitation during the spring months. Higher
precipitation during the spring typically results in higher production.
The estimated eﬀects for the agricultural population sample are presented in Table 4. First,
we show the estimated eﬀects using suitability as a benchmark for comparison. Because weather
data is only available for a subsample of counties, we re-estimate the eﬀect of the proxy for grain
24suitability on the subsample for which we have historical weather information. The estimates
shown in column (1) are less precise than those for the full sample, but still show the same
patterns. In column (2), we present the estimates of (3) which replace grain suitability with
log average spring precipitation. The estimates show that this time-varying proxy for local
production produces the same pattern. During normal years, spring precipitation is positively
correlated with birth cohort size: the elasticity between rainfall and birth cohort size is 0.019.
During famine years, it is negatively correlated. The elasticity, which is the sum of the main
eﬀect of precipitation and the interaction eﬀect, is -0.077. Both coeﬃcients and the sum of
the two are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In column (3), we control for mean spring
temperature and its interaction with the famine birth years dummy. The estimates are virtually
unchanged. Note that the historical weather data does not form a balanced panel because the
number of weather stations increased rapidly during this period. To check that this does not
bias our estimates, we restrict the sample to counties for which weather data exist for at least
twelve of the eighteen years of our sample. Although less precisely estimated, the coeﬃcients
remain similar.
For consistency, we also estimate the yearly correlation between spring precipitation and birth
cohort size by estimating equation (5) with the interaction terms of spring precipitation and year
dummies as explanatory variables replacing the interaction terms of grain suitability and year
dummies. For this estimate, we exclude the years 1949 and 1950 because there were very few
counties with weather stations in those early years. The coeﬃcients and their 95% conﬁdence
intervals are plotted in Figure 4C and reported in Appendix Table A7 column (2). The patterns
we observe are similar to the grain suitability estimates but are less precisely estimated.44 For
the sake of brevity, we only report the results for agricultural households.45
In summary, the results from the retrospective analysis support the main ﬁndings using
historical data and show that the relationship between per capita food production and birth
cohort size reversed during the famine. The retrospective analysis also provides several additional
insights. First, it shows that the cross-sectional patterns in famine severity are primarily driven by
agricultural households. Second, it shows that the reversal in the correlation between production
and survival is not aﬀected by controls for time-varying diﬀerences across provinces. This fact
is important because it means that the reversal exists even allowing for the possibility that
each provincial government enacted diﬀerent policies in response to the aggregate production
fall in 1959. Third, the results incorporating precipitation data show that the retrospective
estimates from using a time-invariant proxy for production are not driven by the possibility that
counties that are more productive on average were less productive in 1959. Finally, and most
44In theory, we can also aggregate the weather data to the province level and repeat the estimates with mortality
rates. However, this will result in extremely imprecise estimates in practice since for many years, there are only
one or two weather stations in a province.
45When we repeat these estimates on the sample of non-agricultural population, we ﬁnd that weather does
not systematically aﬀect birth cohort sizes. The estimates are less than half the magnitude as than those for
agricultural households and statistically insigniﬁcant. As with the estimates for agricultural households, these
results are consistent with those from our main analysis. They are available upon request.
25importantly, the fact that we ﬁnd the same spatial patterns between historical weather and birth
cohort size as between historical production and mortality rates is additional evidence that the
latter relationship is not entirely driven by government mis-reporting of the historical production
and mortality data.
5 The Grain Procurement System
The previous section provides evidence for two ﬁndings that identify grain procurement policy
as a driving force of the famine. The ﬁrst ﬁnding that food production in 1959 was suﬃcient
for subsistence implies that the famine could not have been solely caused by the drop in food
production.46 Two important facts follow from this result: 1) the determinants of the fall in
production – whatever they were – cannot by themselves explain the famine; and 2) the allocation
of food across China must have played a role in causing the famine. This result begs the question:
what transformed the fall in production into a famine?
Our second empirical ﬁnding is that the correlation between regional well-being and produc-
tion reversed during the famine such that regional famine severity was increasing with per capita
production. Together with the fact that China was a centrally-planned non-market economy,
this observation implies that conventional market mechanisms which generate unequal food dis-
tribution cannot explain the Chinese famine. Instead, we must consider the role of government
food distribution policy in transforming the production fall into a famine.
In the following discussion, we document the details of China’s food procurement regime and
the political climate in order to better understand the mechanism for this policy and motivate
the model in the next section. In particular, we highlight historical evidence that suggests that
a key feature of the centrally planned procurement system was inﬂexibility due to diﬃculties in
aggregating and responding to information. Moreover, the evidence suggests that inﬂexibility
was likely a response to the lack of local incentives to truthfully report production and a conse-
quence of political pressures to follow rules and the limited bureaucratic capacity of the central
government.
Grain procurement was planned centrally. The central government decided the production
targets each year. These made their way down to regional government oﬃcials, who then traveled
to collectives each spring to announce the expected production (e.g., production targets) for
that collective. Procurement typically took place after the fall harvest around November. The
central government’s method for determining procurement levels are outlined in initiatives such
as the “Three Fix Policy”. In 1956, this policy stipulated that to “ﬁx” procurement levels for
each collective, expected local production levels in 1956 should be based on production in 1955,
and subsistence levels of consumption and seed retention should be based on population and
46This is perhaps not surprising since according to the aggregate data reported by Li and Yang (2005), the
average worker retained approximately 193 kg of grain after procurement in 1959, which is more that what is
needed to stay productive and much more than what is needed to stay alive (see Appendix Table A8).
26production needs.47
The main reason for setting procurement based on expected production is that peasants and
local oﬃcials were not incentivized to report actual production truthfully. Discussions amongst
the top party leadership show that they were well aware that peasants had an incentive to under-
report production in order to retain a larger amount of grain and to prevent the government from
demanding greater production in the future. Local leaders were similarly unreliable as they could
share the incentives of the peasants or over-report production for political advantage (Fairbank,
1986: pp. 305-8). Given the lack of reliability in the reported information, it was logical for the
government to condition procurement on historic information.
To a large extent, bureaucrats seem to have followed the prescribed procurement rules, espe-
cially in 1958 and 1959, when political tensions were intensiﬁed between Mao and members of the
Politburo who did not support his GLF policies. At the height of tensions, Mao purged a signif-
icant proportion of moderate political leaders from the upper and middle levels of government,
creating an environment where few were willing to report that production in 1959 was lower
than expected before the numbers could be aggregated and presented to Mao in an impersonal
manner.48 In other words, the rules, together with the political pressure to follow them led to a
very inﬂexible policy.49
Before moving the discussion forward, it is interesting to note that along with political pres-
47See Johnson (1998) for a discussion of the food procurement system. Historical grain policies are outlined in
public government archives. See http://2006.panjin.gov.cn/site/gb/pj/pjjz/pjjz_detail.php?column_id=2382.
48The political climate in 1959 was extremely tense and most likely caused leaders to follow rules, even those
that were likely to prove problematic later. The GLF had been received with cynicism from the very beginning,
and its failures and successes were crucial to Mao’s political leadership. In December 1958, at a meeting of
the Central Committee of the CCP in Wuhan, party leaders refused to fully endorse GLF policies. Following
this meeting, Liu Shaoqi replaced Mao, who remained Party Chairman, as the Head of State in early Spring of
1959 (Spence, 1991: pp. 581). Many historians view this as an unwilling step down by Mao. It is therefore not
surprising that further challenges of the GLF resulted in a strong response from Mao. In July 1959, Mao famously
purged Peng Dehuai, a ﬁeld marshal of extremely high political standing, for criticizing collectivization and other
GLF policies and expressing forebodings of famine. These problems of the collective system mandated by the GLF
were a source of contention between communist party moderates and hard-liners who backed Mao. However, with
the exception of Peng Dehuai who did a tour of the countryside during the spring of 1959, there is no evidence
that any top leader ever obtained an accurate picture of the problems of collectivization and the danger of famine.
Peng discretely reported these problems to Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong in a personal letter. The
problems he mentioned included reduced incentives to work, a diversion of labor away from agriculture, and
over-procurement of grain by mid-level party leaders who were under-pressure to fulﬁll grain target quotas that
had been set too high. Fearing a political revolt against his leadership based on perceived failures of the GLF,
Mao used the contents of this letter to purge Peng as a rightist at the historic Lushan conference in July of 1959.
Peng was put under house arrest and later executed during the Cultural Revolution. At this conference, the top
party leaders made clear that the ﬁrst year of the GLF was a success and that collectivization was increasing
grain harvest more than ever (Becker, 1996, pp. 87-92). The Lushan conference had important consequences. The
removal of Peng was accompanied by a purge of his supporters amongst top party members as well as moderate
mid-level party leaders who had expressed concerns about collectivization and the dangers of famine (Fairbank,
1986: pp. 303-335; Becker, 1996, pp. 93). It put remaining leaders under enormous pressure to deliver the high
targets for grain quotas for the harvest of 1959 in order to not be grouped with the critics of Mao (Spence, 1991:
pp. 574-583).
49The rigidity of rules and how it caused oﬃcials to sacriﬁce eﬃciency can be observed in food delivery even
in the post-Mao era. Oi (1989) documents that local leaders punctually put harvests by the roadside for pick up
even in bad weather causing huge losses sometimes. Presumably, these leaders knew that they would be punished
for the lack of punctual delivery but not for bad weather induced losses.
27sure, an additional reason for why bureaucrats were willing to deliver large quantities of grain
to central procurers is the implicit promise the new government made that no one would ever
be allowed to starve. The party often referred to this promise as “the iron rice bowl”. This
implicit social contract may have contributed to the belief on the part of local leaders that once
people began to starve, they would be given grain replenishments by the central government.
This attitude is consistent with accounts of collective kitchens providing large quantities of food
even after procurement.50 This optimism was probably also encouraged by the fact that in 1959
production was remembered as plentiful and well above subsistence needs. In this case, a rea-
sonable response for local leaders is to give the government the planned amount of procurement
and postpone their plea for grain (and potential punishment) from the central government.51
An additional source of inﬂexibility that is entirely independent of incentive issues is the com-
bination of limited bureaucratic capacity and political centralization. The Standing Committee
of around seven Politburo members was the only government organ with the power to make ma-
jor policy decisions. It attempted to directly control 21 provinces, ﬁve autonomous regions, and
three municipalities, which in turn governed approximately 2,300 county-level governments that
supervised over one million branch oﬃces of the Chinese Communist Party in towns, villages,
army units, factories, mines, and schools. Policies were established at the top levels and imple-
mented by lower level governments. Information on the eﬀectiveness of policies was collected
locally, aggregated by the regional government, and then eventually reported upwards to the
Standing Committee (Fairbank, 1986: pp. 297-341; Spence, 1991: pp. 542).
China’s size proved to be a diﬃculty for the centrally planned regime. China is the world’s
third largest country in terms of geographic size.52 Therefore, conditions which determine agri-
cultural production, amongst other concerns of the central government, varied widely across
regions. China’s poor transportation and communications infrastructure also greatly added to
the central government’s diﬃculties in obtaining and aggregating information.53
In the late 1950s, three factors signiﬁcantly exacerbated these structural diﬃculties in admin-
50The role of communal kitchens are studied by works such as Yang (1996) and Chang and Wen (1997).
51To the best of our knowledge, there is unfortunately, no systematic documentation on why bureaucrats
followed the rules. Therefore, our views here should be conservatively interpreted as reasonable speculations
based on the historical facts. See Becker (1996) for overview of the promises of the new government.
52More precisely, it is the third or fourth largest country, and the exact ranking depends on boundary deﬁnitions
for certain territories of China and the United States.
53Thousands of oﬃcials were sent from urban areas to collectives for procurement and information gathering.
When they returned to cities, information from each was collected and cumulatively reported to the provincial
capital, which aggregated information from across the province and then, in turn, reported it to Beijing. Only then
could Beijing have information for the entire country. Traveling between cities, where information was accumulated
and policies made, and rural areas, where the food was produced, was very time consuming. Transportation
networks were almost completely destroyed by decades of civil unrest (e.g., the civil war between the Sun-Yat
Sen led Guomingtang (KMT) and warlords, 1911-1935; the war with Japan, 1936-1945; the civil war between
Communist CCP and Chang Kai-Shek led KMT, 1945-49) and reparations had just begun (Fairbank, 1986: pp.
278). The most common method of transportation for oﬃcials who traveled to rural areas was a combination
of government conveyance vehicles, bicycles and beasts of burden. In a country as geographically vast as China,
where urban centers were relatively few and geographically concentrated, it could take many weeks to reach an
outlying collective. Moreover, rural areas were typically not connected by telecommunications infrastructure.
This meant that the central government learned about production ﬁgures from rural areas rather slowly.
28istration. First, in order to reduce the budget deﬁcit, the government severely cut expenditures
on administration, which declined from 19.3% of total government budget expenditure in 1950
to only 7.8% in 1957 (Eckstein, 1977: pp. 186). Since both China’s economy and government
expenditures were increasing during this period, these ﬁgures suggest that government admin-
istration did not grow even though the economy and thus the scope of central planning had
increased substantially. Second, the government lost much of its able personnel from the bu-
reaucracy when approximately 700,000 of its most educated bureaucrats were purged in 1957
after the Hundred Flowers Movement.54 Moreover, in 1958, Mao abolished the State Statisti-
cal Bureau, which meant that there were no statisticians or demographers in 1959 to project
national production ﬁgures before all of the harvests were physically procured and aggregated
across regions (Fairbank, 1986: pp. 300; Spence, 1991: pp. 580). Third, for political reasons,
Mao implemented measures which further decreased the structural ﬂexibility of the system. For
example, after the Lushan meeting in 1959, in order to solidify his power, Mao banned the twice-
weekly meetings of the Standing Committee and further removed decision-making powers from
regional governments, two institutions which helped the leadership address unexpected shocks.
By the end of 1959, the Standing Committee met only once every two months, and the regional
leadership had little power for independent decision making (Fairbank, 1986: pp. 303).
To summarize, many factors hampered the Chinese government’s ability to aggregate and
respond to new information. The inﬂexibility of the Chinese government is similar to the inherent
inﬂexibility in centrally planned economies as discussed in the historic works of Von Mises (1935)
and Hayek (1945) and in the theoretical work of Weitzman (1974).
6 Model of Procurement
In this section, we develop a model of procurement policy which shows that policy inﬂexibility,
as described in the previous section, could have generated a famine with the spatial patterns in
our empirical results. The model is also useful for understanding the contribution of additional
factors (e.g., transport cost, regional favoritism, and local mis-reporting of production) to the
famine. Moreover, it allows us to assess the merits of the Chinese procurement policy of ﬁxing
quantities relative to an alternative central planning policy of ﬁxing prices.
6.1 Model
We consider procurement policy in an environment in which diﬀerent regions produce diﬀerent
quantities of food. The government can procure food from some regions and redistribute it to
54In 1957, in order to ﬁght oﬀ criticism from intellectuals during the Hundred Flowers Movement, the leadership
promoted the anti-rightist campaign, where as many as 700,000 intellectuals (e.g., high school graduates and
above) were removed from government positions. Being branded as a rightist eﬀectively ended the career of the
individual. Many were demoted to manual labor jobs for re-education. In extreme cases, individuals were sent to
labor camps. This did not directly aﬀect agricultural production, which did not require the labor of intellectuals,
but it crippled the bureaucracy.
29other regions. A key feature of the environment is that all regions are subject to an aggregate
shock that reduces food production. Given our discussion in Section 5, the key constraint faced by
the government is that procurement policy cannot respond perfectly to this shock. For simplicity,
we focus on the extreme case in which no adjustment to the shock is possible, capturing the notion
that the government is either unaware of the shock or cannot respond to the shock. Given this
constraint on policy, our model is therefore in the spirit of Weitzman (1974), who studies the
optimal choice of quantities in a centrally planned economy in which quantities cannot change
with aggregate shocks.
More formally, the economy consists of M rural regions labeled by i = f1;:::;Mg and N urban
regions labeled by i = fM+1;:::;M+Ng. Every region is populated by a mass pi of identical
households with a stochastic per-capita agricultural endowment ei(s)  0. This endowment
depends on the aggregate shock s = fH;Lg which can be high (H) or low (L). Let Prfs = Hg =
1 Prfs = Lg = 1 m 2 (0;1), the probability that a food reducing aggregate shock is avoided.
Let ei(H) = b ei and ei(L) = b ei  si. b ei parameterizes the productivity of a region since a higher
b ei corresponds to a higher level of food production per capita. si captures the volatility of
production in region i. Urban regions do not produce any food, so that ei(s) = 0 for s = fH;Lg
if i 2 fM+1;M+Ng. We consider economies subject to the following two assumptions regarding
the food production process:
Assumption 1 ei(s) is strictly increasing in b ei for s = fH;Lg.
Assumption 2 si is strictly increasing in b ei.
Assumption 1 states that more productive regions produce more food per capita during both
the high and the low shock. Assumption 2 states that more productive regions experience a
higher variance in production (i.e., a sharper drop during the aggregate food downturn). These
two assumptions are satisﬁed for instance if the percentage drop in production is the same across
regions. Recall from Section 3.1 that both of these assumptions hold for 1959.
Every household in region i produces food ei(s) and is subject to a level of food procurement
ti, where a negative value of ti corresponds to a food subsidy. A household’s level of food
consumption ci(s) therefore satisﬁes
ci(s) = ei(s) ti for s = H;L. (6)
Note that while food consumption and production depend on the aggregate shock s, the level
of procurement ti does not depend on the aggregate shock. This assumption is motivated by our
discussion in Section 5 where we argue that a central feature of the Chinese procurement is its
inﬂexibility. Though we focus on the extreme situation of complete inﬂexibility, all of our results
also apply in more general settings in which the government can observe an imperfect noisy signal
about the state of the economy or adjust planned policies at a cost.55 We take this inﬂexibility as
55The details are omitted for brevities but are available upon request.
30given and do not microfound it since our discussion in Section 5 indicates that there are multiple
historical factors behind it.56 Note that since the shock si equals 0 for urban regions (since they
produce no food), the level of consumption ci(s) is independent of the aggregate shock for these
households.
We also allow the government to have an exogenous aggregate procurement target q  0 (net
of interregional transfers), which represents the use of grain for activities other than immediate
food consumption, such as storage or export. As such, the government’s budget constraint can




piti = q. (7)
The government is utilitarian. We make this assumption to highlight the point that, even if the
government has the best intentions and weighs individuals equally, a famine with the empirically
observed spatial patterns can occur.58 Therefore, the government chooses a procurement system




pi((1 m)p(ci(H))c +mp(ci(L))c) : (8)
p(ci(s)) corresponds to the probability of survival as a function of consumption ci(s), and c
corresponds to the value of life.59 We assume that p() is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave, so that the probability of survival rises with food consumption
but is subject to diminishing returns.60
The government knows the productivity b ei and the volatility si of each region and the prob-
ability of the aggregate shocks. It is clear in this environment that if the government could
56One natural microfoundation takes into account incentives to mis-report production, either for farmers wishing
to under-report production or for career-motivated region leaders wishing to over-report production. In such an
environment, if the government must conﬁne policies in region i to depend only on region i’s report of production
(because of limited communication infrastructure, for instance), then the only incentive compatible system assigns
a ﬁxed level of procurement for each region which does not depend on that region’s report.
57As we discussed in the section on background, the government was using grain to fund investment in industry.
The government may have also wished to procure increasing quantities of grain from rural regions as a means of
providing incentives for farmers to raise production levels since it was procuring more and more over time. Note
that an indirect eﬀect of this policy would be to also reduce the total amount produced in each region ei(s) by
weakening the labor supply, an argument made by Li and Yang (2005).
58More generally, our results hold if the government is approximately utilitarian since the government then
chooses policies which make expected marginal utility approximately equal across households. See Section 6.2 for
a discussion of the eﬀect of assuming alternative preferences for the government.
59One can alternatively interpret p(ci(s)) as corresponding to the fraction of the population in region i which
dies from starvation in an environment in which a minimal level of consumption c is required to stay alive.
Speciﬁcally, one can imagine that the food consumption of a given individual z in region i equals ci(s)+eiz for eiz
which represents an idiosyncratic shock. Thus p(ci(s)) = Prfci(s)+eiz  cg.
60One could alternatively let the procurement target q be endogenous in our framework by adding an additional
term in the government objective: V (q), for V () which is increasing and concave. This reﬁnement does not aﬀect
any of our results.
Note that one could easily incorporate the government’s potential bias towards the urban elite without changing
any of our results since this would correspond to assigning a higher weight to urban regions in the social objective.
31condition procurement ti on the shock s, then it would provide all households with the same
level of food consumption conditional on the shock. In such an environment, there would be no
cross-regional variation in mortality in response to an agricultural shock.61
In our environment, such a redistributive policy is not possible because procurement can-
not respond to the shock. More speciﬁcally, consider a hypothetical procurement policy t =
ftigi2f1;M+Ng. Given Assumption 2 and equation (6), it is clear that the variance in consumption
for a given region is increasing in b ei (i.e., more productive regions experience a higher variance
in production). Thus, under an inﬂexible procurement policy, it is not possible for the govern-
ment to equalize consumption across regions in all states of the world. More speciﬁcally, the
government, in choosing the optimal policy, solves the following program:
max
t
(8) s.t. (6) and (7).
Letting y correspond to the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (7), the ﬁrst order conditions
to the government’s program yield:
(1 m)p0(ci(H))+mp0(ci(L)) = y 8i. (9)
Therefore, the government equates the expected marginal utility of food consumption of all
households, taking into account that more productive households will inevitably experience a
higher variance in food consumption. Equation (9) has some important implications which are
summarized in the below proposition. All of the proofs are shown in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The policy of the government has the following features:
1. Aggregate survival å
M+N
i=1 pip(ci(s)) conditional on s = fH;Lg under an inﬂexible policy is
below that which occurs under a fully ﬂexible policy,
2. Procurement ti is increasing in productivity b ei, and
3. Regional survival p(ci(s)) is increasing in production ei(s) if s = H, and regional survival
p(ci(s)) is decreasing in production ei(s) if s = L.
Corollary 1 The variance of mortality Var(p(ci(s))) is increasing in productivity b ei.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 states that famine intensity is higher under an inﬂexible
government policy relative to famine intensity under a fully ﬂexible policy which equalizes the
distribution of food consumption (and minimizes mortality). This result follows from Assumption
2 which implies that the variance in food consumption must diﬀer across regions under an
61In principle, a famine could still occur if the procurement target q is very high. However, as a reminder,
recall from the discussion in the background section that if one takes the aggregate procurement data used by Li
and Yang (2005) at face value, average per capita grain retention in 1959 was not low enough to cause mortality.
32inﬂexible policy. This result suggests that even under the best procurement policy, it is possible
for some individuals to die of famine.
The second part of Proposition 1 states that procurement is increasing in productivity b ei,
so that more productive regions experience a higher procurement tax relative to less productive
regions. This conclusion follows from Assumption 1. More productive regions produce more
in all states of the world, so that a government seeking to equalize food consumption will re-
distribute towards the less productive regions and procure more from more productive regions.
This implication is consistent with data we collected on province-level procurement targets and
production for the years 1980-88, which, to the best of our knowledge (based on interviews with
government oﬃcials), used a similar formula for setting procurement as in the 1950s and 1960s.62
Appendix Figure A4 plots procurement targets as a function of a moving average of per capita
production in the 1980s. It shows a strong positive correlation between procurement targets and
average per capita production.
The third part of Proposition 1 states that, during a food production boom, mortality and pro-
duction are negatively correlated across regions. In contrast, during a food production downturn,
mortality and production are positively correlated across regions. This prediction is consistent
with our empirical ﬁndings regarding the spatial distribution of famine intensity. To understand
this phenomenon intuitively, recall that more productive regions have more volatile production
(Assumption 2), though all regions are subject to an inﬂexible and non-volatile procurement
policy. Thus, more productive regions experience more volatile consumption, a result stated
formally in Corollary 1. Since the government cares about all households equally, it follows
that households subject to more volatile consumption experience relatively higher consumption
during the food production boom and relatively lower consumption during the food production
downturn, leading to the spatial patterns of mortality.63 In other words, in the presence of a
large shock to production, the government over-procures from the more productive regions (rel-
ative to the fully ﬂexible policy), and this over-procurement ampliﬁes the mortality eﬀect of the
downturn in production. For an illustration of the mechanics of this model, recall the simple
stylized example presented in Table 1.
It is important to note that this third result on the correlation between food production
and mortality refers to food production booms and downturns in a relative sense and not in
an absolute sense. In other words, food production and mortality are positively correlated if
food production is lower than anticipated, and vice versa. This can explain why mortality and
regional food production were positively correlated during the famine but not in other years
when aggregate food production per capita may have been comparable in levels to 1959. We
present a dynamic version of the model in the Appendix to illustrate this formally. All of our
62The main diﬀerence between the famine era and subsequent decades is that the government aimed for a lower
level of procurement, but the method for determining the diﬀerences in amount by region did not change. We
were unable to obtain procurement target data from the famine era.
63If the government is biased towards the urban elite, this prediction will hold for the sample of rural regions
but not for the comparison of urban versus rural regions.
33results are robust to this extension.
Notice that the quantitative magnitude of such a mechanism can be potentially large. In
practice, it is diﬃcult to estimate this model given the challenge associated with determining the
exact functional form for p() (see the discussion in Section 4.1). In principle, the combination
of an inﬂexible policy, a large unexpected drop in production, and a high aggregate procurement
target could signiﬁcantly amplify the mortality consequence of a drop in per capita production.
See the Appendix for a stylized example that formally illustrates this point.
In addition to capturing patterns associated with the famine, our model makes several general
predictions regarding mortality outcomes under an inﬂexible procurement system. For instance,
consider a generalization of our setting in which every single region’s stochastic food endowment
ei(s) is subject to a set of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, where the level of procurement is
independent of the realized shock because of inﬂexibility. In such an environment, the following
two patterns emerge: (1) mortality is negatively correlated with per capita food production within
a region, and (2) variance in per capita food production is positively correlated with variance in
mortality across regions. These two patterns emerge precisely because of the imperfect insurance
resulting from the inﬂexibility of the food procurement system; regions must bear a portion of
the risk associated with their own stochastic production. We ﬁnd that these two patterns are
present in the data. More speciﬁcally, if we re-estimate (1) with province ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcient on grain production is negative and that the sum of this coeﬃcient plus the
interaction eﬀect is also negative. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the correlation between the within-
province standard deviation in log mortality and the within-province standard deviation in log
production per capita is positive.64 These patterns which point to the presence of imperfect
insurance provide additional evidence regarding the inﬂexibility of the procurement system.
6.2 Additional Factors
Our model shows how a procurement policy that cannot adjust to aggregate shocks can amplify
the mortality increase from an aggregate food production downturn. Moreover, when the per-
centage drop in production is broadly the same across regions, as was the case in China in 1959,
an inﬂexible procurement policy can lead to the spatial patterns of production and mortality
that appear in the historical and retrospective data. Within this framework, many factors can
further amplify the famine. In this section, we discuss the role of factors that are commonly
believed to have contributed to the Chinese famine: transport costs, government bias towards
certain regions and mis-reporting of production. In each case, we discuss how the factor can
amplify the magnitude of the famine predicted by an inﬂexible procurement policy.
First, we consider the role of transport cost, an important mechanism in the general context
of famines and the focus of several recent studies on the causes of famine (e.g., Shiue, 2004,
64These correlations are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. For brevity, we do not report them in the
paper. They are available upon request. In addition, we ﬁnd that the within-county standard deviation in log
cohort size is positively correlated with the within-county standard deviation in rainfall.
342005; Burgess and Donaldson, 2010). If transport costs are high, they could generate a famine
by making it diﬃcult for the government to transfer food from high food productivity regions to
low food productivity regions. It is straightforward to introduce transport costs into our model
without changing our results. For instance, one can subtract dt2
i =2 from the right hand side of
equation (6), where d 0 reﬂects the transport cost. Adding such a transport cost will make the
government’s planning problem even more diﬃcult and further amplify the eﬀect of a downturn
in food production by causing a signiﬁcant portion of food to be lost in transit.
Second, we consider the possibility of governmental regional favoritism. This phenomenon
could arise from political self-interest or malevolence, as leaders may prioritize certain regions
that are more important for ensuring political success or maintaining political stability.65 In
particular, Lin and Yang (2000) argue that the famine era government strongly favored urban
areas. In our model, favoritism could be introduced by assigning more weight to certain regions
in the social welfare function. This would lead to higher famine intensity in the less favored
regions and to further inequality in food consumption across regions.
Finally, we consider the eﬀects of local mis-reporting of production. Numerous survivors and
past oﬃcials recall that local oﬃcials over-reported grain production in order to appease party
leaders.66 It is important to note that our model already incorporates this possibility of mis-
reporting – it is one of the reasons that the central government cannot trust local reports and
resorts to an inﬂexible policy. However, we can further incorporate mis-reporting in a dynamic
extension of our environment which is explore more formally in the Appendix. One can imagine
that the government forms its regional production expectations based on past production reports.
In such an environment, it is clear that over-reporting in previous years will cause the government
to over-procure during an aggregate downturn, which will amplify the ensuing mortality rates.
More generally, government incompetence can also cause the miscalculation of parameters and
amplify famine. For instance, if the government under-estimates region-speciﬁc food production
volatility, si, or the probability of a food production downturn, m, the government will over-
procure by even more, a behavior that reinforces our result.
While the factors discussed above contribute to famine, they cannot alone easily explain the
spatial patterns of famine that we observe in the data absent an inﬂexible procurement policy.
First, transport costs make it diﬃcult for the government to transport food from productive
regions to unproductive regions, causing famine severity to decrease with regional production.
In such a scenario, cities, which do not produce food, will always suﬀer the worst famine. Both
implications run contrary to the ﬁndings in the data.67 Second, a government regional bias on
its own would cause some regions to consistently experience higher mortality both during food
65Recall from Section 2 that there is little evidence that the government intended for the famine to occur in
general. Therefore, we do not consider the obvious consequences of a malevolent government that wants famine.
66Becker (1996) provides many examples in his book.
67In addition, transports costs probably also contributed to general inﬂexibility in the centrally planned pro-
curement regime by making communication among government bureaucrats diﬃcult and by making it diﬃcult
for the government to reverse its procurement policy and return the grain back from depots to rural areas.
35production booms and downturns. It cannot explain the reversal in the correlation between food
production and mortality between famine and non-famine years unless if favoritism somehow also
reversed in 1959. Moreover, recall that the retrospective analysis using county-level data shows
that the reversal of the relationship between food production and well-being exists even when we
control for province-year ﬁxed eﬀects. This means that for favoritism to generate the reversal,
favoritism would have to be reversed not only at the province-level, but also at the county-level
within provinces.68 Finally, over-reporting of production cannot, absent inﬂexibility, generate the
reversal in the correlation between per capita production and mortality rate during the famine
unless the correlation between production and over-reporting is also reversed during the famine.
That this scenario took place precisely in 1959, and in 1959 alone, seems highly implausible.69
More generally, additional factors which may have contributed to famine cannot on their own
yield theoretical predictions consistent with the striking positive correlation between regional
food production and mortality that exists only in 1959 and is reversed in non-famine years. This
is particularly the case since there are no known major policy changes that are speciﬁc to 1959.70
This suggests that the combination of inﬂexibility and an unexpected drop in production in 1959
are critical for understanding the geographic distribution of famine in China.
68We can explore the existence of an urban bias directly by including the log of urban population and its
interaction term with the famine year dummy as controls into equation (1). The results are reported in Appendix
Table A9. They show that having a larger urban population results in higher provincial mortality rates on average.
This supports Lin and Yang’s (2000) argument that there was an urban bias. However, the urban population does
not aﬀect mortality diﬀerently during the famine (the diﬀerence between the main eﬀect and interaction eﬀect is
insigniﬁcant). More importantly, our main results, the reversal in the correlation between grain production and
mortality during the famine years is robust to these controls. In fact, it becomes more prominent in magnitude and
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results suggest that there was an urban bias in the procurement
policy, but that this bias does not aﬀect the reversal in the relationship between production and mortality caused
by the inﬂexibility in the grain procurement system.
69For mis-reporting alone (i.e., with a hypothetically fully ﬂexible procurement policy) to account for the spatial
distribution of famine, one would have to make the following two assumptions: (i) For some behavioral reasons,
regional leaders who over-report during the food production downturn come from more productive regions and
also under-report during the food production boom; and (ii) the government is unaware of this mis-reporting bias.
This would generate the positive correlation between productivity and mortality in famine years and the reversal
of this correlation in non-famine years. Our prior is that this is unlikely. However, we cannot be conclusive on this
point because data for measuring regional over-reporting do not exist. In the interest of completeness, we searched
through 1958-59 provincial newspapers stored in the National Library Archives in Beijing for contemporaneous
oﬃcial reports of production. We were only able to ﬁnd reported production numbers for a few provinces in 1959.
They show no apparent correlation between production and over-reporting, which we measured as the diﬀerence
between the newspaper reports and either 1958-59 production or average production. These data should be
interpreted very cautiously due to their poor quality. They are not reported in the paper for brevity.
70Recall from Section 2 that communism began in 1949, collectivization began in the early 1950s, the grain
procurement system had been in place since the mid-1950s, communal kitchens had been in place at least since the
Great Leap Forward began in 1957, which also implies that other GLF policies such as the diversion of labor from
agriculture also began in 1957. Procurement levels had also been high since the mid 1950s. Appendix Table A8
column (6) shows that procurement had been approximately 30% since 1954. Had production in 1959 continued
to grow at the same rate as previous years, procurement in 1959 would have been very similar.
366.3 Counterfactual Exercise: Fixing Quantities vs. Prices
Thus far, we have provided qualitative and quantitative evidence that suggests the Chinese
government’s commitment to central planning led to an inﬂexible procurement policy, which in
1959, caused severe over-procurement and famine. A natural question that follows is whether the
Chinese government, as central-planners constrained by inﬂexibility, could have chosen a better
policy. For an inﬂexible central planner, the obvious alternative is to purchase food from rural
areas at a ﬁxed price to redistribute to urban areas. This style of policy was used in other central
planning regimes like the Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy. In China, price ﬁxing
was used in the early 1950s and again in more recent years.
In this section, we extend the model developed in Section 6.1 to discuss the trade-oﬀs between
quantity versus price controls. These two policies have diﬀerent implications for which segment
of the population bears the burden of aggregate shocks to food production. In highlighting these
trade-oﬀs, we show that a government is better oﬀ pursuing quantity controls if a large fraction of
the population is rural and if the magnitude of productivity shocks across the rural populations
is relatively homogenous.
For this exercise, we introduce a second consumption good to the model to serve as the
numeraire for the price of food P. Our exercise is similar in spirit to Weitzman (1974) who
studies the use of price and quantity controls in an inﬂexible policy setting. As in Weitzman
(1974), one can gain insight by assuming linear preferences over the non-food good and the
quadratic functional form for p(). More speciﬁcally, letting xi(s) represent household i’s non-










if ci(s)  c
if ci(s) > c
for some parameter a >0.71 The total supply of the non-food good is normalized to some positive
number X, so that å
M+N
i=1 xi(s) = X. For simplicity, we set the aggregate procurement target q to
zero.
The government ﬁxes the price of food as follows. It commits to purchasing any quantity
of food from rural households at price P and redistributes this food to urban households. To
ﬁnance these purchases, the government taxes the non-food endowment of households. Note
that because preferences over non-food consumption are linear, the government does not care
about inequality in non-food consumption from this taxation, so we can eﬀectively ignore non-
food consumption in the government’s optimization program. For simplicity, suppose that the
71Given our assumption on preferences in this extension, the utilitarian optimum could be achieved with per-
fectly competitive markets. For this exercise, we rule out this possibility to examine the less dramatic measure of
ﬁxed supplier prices which the Chinese government may have been able to pursue during this time period.
37government chooses an interior price P  maxi2f1;Mgp0(ei(L)) so that it is suﬃciently high that
all rural households would choose to sell food to the government in all states of the world.72
Moreover, to facilitate interpretation, suppose that the implied level of consumption under the
optimal policy always satisﬁes c  ci(s)  c a 1=2 so that the value of p() is always between
0 and 1. In this circumstance, the ﬁrst order conditions for rural households would imply that
p0(ci(s)) = P for s = fH;Lg 8i. (10)
so that all rural households have a level of food consumption that is independent of the aggregate
shock and that sets the marginal utility of food consumption equal to the price of food. This
setup means that during the food production boom, farmers sell more food to the government,
and during the food production downturn, they sell less food to the government. Consequently,
urban households all have a volatile consumption and endure the entire risk associated with the
aggregate production shock. Interestingly, this situation is the exact opposite to the environment
with ﬁxed quantities in which the entire burden of the aggregate production shock is borne by
rural households.
By analogous reasoning as in the environment with ﬁxed quantities, optimal policy implies
the ﬁrst order condition in equation (9), where y must be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier
for the resource constraint of the entire economy. More speciﬁcally, the government equates the
expected marginal utility of food consumption across households, taking into account that this
level of consumption is deterministic for rural households and stochastic for urban households. In
addition to treating all rural households symmetrically, the government treats urban households
symmetrically, so that they all equally bear the burden of the aggregate shocks.
Proposition 2 (ﬁxing quantities dominate ﬁxing prices) Expected mortality is lower under

































5 > 1 (11)
Proposition 2 states that a policy of controlling quantities dominates a policy of controlling
prices if the size of the rural population is signiﬁcantly higher than the size of the urban popula-
tion (i.e., å
M
i=1 pi is signiﬁcantly higher than å
M+N
i=M+1 pi) and if the cross-sectional variance in the














The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Imagine for simplicity that all rural regions
are identical so that condition (11) collapses to å
M
i=1 pi > å
M+N
i=M+1 pi. This means that quantity
controls dominate price controls if the urban population is in the minority. To understand this
72If the government could choose a region-speciﬁc price, it would choose the same price for all regions since it
is utilitarian.
38result, note that if the rural households are a majority, then the government faces a choice
between having a majority of the population experiencing small consumption ﬂuctuations under
ﬁxed quantities versus having a minority of the population facing large consumption ﬂuctuations
under ﬁxed prices. The government prefers to let a majority experience the shock because large
volatilities in consumption are extremely costly to the government from a welfare perspective
and it is better to pool this risk across rural households.73
To understand why quantity controls dominate price controls only if the cross-sectional vari-
ance in the magnitude of shocks is low, imagine for simplicity that rural and urban regions
have the same population size so that (11) collapses to 0 >Var(si). Thus, if rural households
are homogeneous, then quantity and price controls are equivalent from a welfare perspective for
reasons previously discussed. However, if there is any heterogeneity in the productivity shocks
across rural households, then price controls dominate quantity controls. The reason is because
price controls make it possible for the urban population to pool all of the diﬀerential risk faced
by the rural population. For example, if there were two rural regions of equal size, one with a
higher value of the shock si than the other, then the government would prefer to let the urban
population experience an intermediate level of consumption volatility under price controls ver-
sus having one half of the farmers experiencing very high volatility and one half of the farmers
experiencing very low volatility under quantity controls.74
In conclusion, a retrospective evaluation of the merits of the Chinese procurement policy of
ﬁxing quantities versus the alternative policy of ﬁxing prices relies on two factors. On the one
hand, the fact that the urban population was a small minority of the total Chinese population
points to the advantages of the quantity-ﬁxing policy practiced by the Chinese government over
an alternative policy of ﬁxing prices. On the other hand, the fact that rural regions were far
from identical (e.g., more productive regions experienced a larger reduction in total production
during the famine) points to the advantages of ﬁxing prices over ﬁxing quantities. In principle,
the government can pool the risk associated with this heterogeneity by ﬁxing a price at which
farmers will sell their food to the cities, but this will come at the cost of increasing the volatility
of mortality outcomes in cities. The extent to which the procurement policy dominated price
controls is an important quantitative question for future research.75
73This insight is related to Weitzman’s (1974) result that quantity controls dominate price controls if the absolute
value of the second derivative of the beneﬁt function with respect to quantity exceeds the second derivative of
the cost function with respect to quantity. This is also true in our setting if one interprets the beneﬁt function
as the portion of social welfare attributable to the urban population and the cost function as the negative of the
portion of social welfare attributable to the rural population. In this light, the relative curvature of each function
depends on the relative size of the urban and rural population.
74Note that this second eﬀect regarding the distribution of productivity is not present in Weitzman (1974) since
he assumes only one producer for each good.
75Our analysis also ignores the fact that the government may have also put a lot of weight on the accumulation
of grain either for storage purposes or for exportation. To the extent that this was a major concern, this would
bias the government away from choosing a policy of ﬁxing prices and towards a policy of ﬁxing quantities.
397 Conclusion
Our study points to inﬂexible government policy for food distribution as an important factor in
causing the largest famine in history. We show that even if a government is not obviously malev-
olent or incompetent, an ideological commitment to central planning, together with practical
constraints for gathering and responding to information, result in an inﬂexible policy that can
cause a famine when aggregate production falls. If the production falls are broadly proportional
across regions, as was the case in China in 1959, then an inﬂexible policy will reverse the nor-
mally positive correlation between per capita food production and well-being during the shock,
causing the counter-intuitive pattern that famine is more severe in regions that produce more
food per capita.
As with all historical events, the total underlying forces driving the famine are inevitably more
complex than the insights highlighted by one study. While our results show that understanding
the inﬂexible nature of central planning and how it relates to food distribution is crucial for
understanding famine in non-market economies, it would be naive to assert that inﬂexibility was
the sole driver of the deaths of thirty million people or that central planning made their mortality
inevitable. Our theoretical framework, quantitative analyses, and qualitative historical evidence
show that the famine must have in part been the outcome of the unfortunate combination of an
inﬂexible and ambitious procurement policy together with a surprisingly large fall in aggregate
production in 1959. This crisis was further exacerbated by political tensions of the time, which
pressured bureaucrats to follow the prescribed rules. It is interesting to note that the government
did not respond to the famine by abandoning the inﬂexible procurement system altogether.
Instead, it simply reduced procurement rates from approximately 30% in the 1950s to 18% in
the 1970s (see Appendix Table A8). This adjustment, together with the absence of another
production drop of a similar proportions, perhaps explains why China did not experience famine
in subsequent years.76
This study opens several interesting avenues of future research. A natural one is to study the
geographic patterns and institutional details of other famines that have occurred in non-market
economies. Such studies could provide much insight into the determinants of famine and more
generally, shed light on the relevant constraints for central planning. This is important as all
governments engage in some form of central planning. Other interesting topics for future work
include understanding the determinants of the ﬂexibility of government policy and quantifying
the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexible and inﬂexible policies.
76In our sample of 27 provinces, per capita grain production fell by 15% in 1959, which is more than two
standard deviations below the mean growth rate in per capita grain production. There were several other drops
in aggregate production. But the size of these other falls were smaller, typically ranging between 5-10%.
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Much of the recent revisions have been made possible by the uncovering of contemporaneous
reports of production that were not exaggerated and not published in the past. An example
of some of these “re-discovered” collective reports can be found in the multi-volume government
publication Villages for Thirty Years (Ministry of Agriculture, 1989). In theory, the NBS could
have used such reports to estimate the amount of exaggeration and to make projections across
similar regions. As far as we are aware, the details of how the revisions are made in practice have
not been documented. However, a comparison of contemporaneous reports of grain production
and the reconstructed data suggests that the production numbers have been drastically revised
downwards. For example, The People’s Daily (August 1, 1958), claimed that “Rice production
exceeded 7500 kg per mu (0.067 hectare)” for a county in Hubei province. The revised statistics
report that actual grain output in that province was closer to being 120 kg per mu.
If we aggregate production across provinces, our production data for all thirty provinces is
approximately 10% lower than the aggregated production from 24 provinces in the 1989 Ministry
of Agriculture series used by Li and Yang (2005). This is consistent with the notion that during
the ten years between when these two series were published, the NBS made a sincere eﬀort to
revise past production numbers.
Famine induced total mortality numbers vary between 16.5 million (Coale, 1981) to 30 million
(Banister, 1987) due to diﬀerent estimation methods (e.g., 18.5 million in Yao, 1999; 23 million
in Peng, 1987; and 29 million in Ashton et al., 1984). Our mortality data show that mortality
for 27 provinces (excluding Sichuan, Tibet and Hainan) during the years 1959-1961 sum to
approximately 21.5 million individuals. Since most believe that mortality numbers were very
high in Sichuan, which is not included in our data, this means that our estimates are not far
from the higher estimates of mortality.
Birth Cohort Size Data
The relationship between historical mortality data and retrospectively constructed cohort sizes
can be illustrated visually by plotting mortality rates and cohort sizes over time for each province.
Appendix Figures A2A and A2B show clearly that for every province that exhibits a spike in
mortality rate during the famine in Appendix Figure A2A, there is a corresponding drop in
famine birth cohort size in Appendix Figure A2B. However, there are several provinces that
exhibit a drop in birth cohort size in Appendix Figure A2B for which there is no corresponding
spike in mortality rate in Appendix Figure A2A (e.g., Guangdong, Henan, Jiangxi, Shandong).
Note that using the survival measure, we are able to proxy for famine intensity for the three
provinces for which there is no famine era mortality data (e.g., Sichuan, Hainan, and Tibet).
There are two caveats for interpreting this retrospective measure of famine severity. First, a
44small number of non-agricultural households in 1990 may have been agricultural households at
the time of the famine. We believe that this number is very small because it is very diﬃcult for
households to transition one’s household type from agriculture to non-agriculture. Second, there
may have been some cross-regional migration between the time of the famine and 1990. Recall
from Section 2 that famine-driven migration did not occur in mass due to heavy restrictions.
However, migration may have occurred for other reasons afterwards. This is unlikely to be a
big issue since studies have found that strict migration policies during this period actually made
it extremely diﬃcult for rural individuals to move.77 However, to be cautious, we attempt to
address this with the data. The Census does not report region of birth. Therefore, we restrict
the sample to households who report as living in the place they are reporting from for at least
ﬁve years. This excludes very few households from the sample, most of which are amongst non-
agricultural households. For the purposes of our study, we then assume that for this restricted
sample, the county of residence is the county of birth. As another precautionary measure, we
focus our analysis on the agricultural households since most of the migration would have been
concentrated among non-agricultural households between urban areas.
Suitability
The GAEZ (2002) data are the result of over twenty years of research and are the product
of a joint collaboration between the FAO and the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA). The data on suitability is available at a 50 km50 km grid cell level, where
one can choose the level of agricultural inputs on which to base the calculation. Our chosen
level of inputs allows for rain-fed irrigation but no heavy machinery or chemical fertilizers since
GLF policies forbade chemical fertilizers and since the use of heavy machinery such as tractors
would have been unlikely in this era. We aggregate grid-level data to the county data as follows.
The grid-level data reports the predicted amount of output of rice and wheat. If a grid can
produce 40% or more of the maximum possible output for any grid (in the world), then we
code it as “suitable”. The suitability measure at the county-level is the fraction of grids within
a county that is suitable. We use this measure for the sake of computational ease.78 Since
procurement targets treated rice and wheat similarly, our measure of suitability is the union of
77There is broad consensus that migration was largely controlled until very recently, and most of the migration
that did occur was across urban areas, which would not aﬀect this study. In principle, it is possible that some
rural regions at the time of the 1990 Census Remuneration may have contained urban youths who were moved
from cities to rural areas during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). However, there have been no accounts to
suggest that such movement was correlated with famine intensity. See West and Zhao (2000), which surveys
studies on migration in China.
78Moderately changing the threshold so that suitable is deﬁned as a grid that produces 20% or 60% of the
maximum does not aﬀect the estimates. Using county-level production data from the 1997 Agricultural Census
shows that our measures of suitability are highly correlated with actual production. The correlation across counties
is approximately 0.7 and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. To assess whether our suitability data are good
proxies for historical production, we can aggregate the measures to the province-level to show that suitability is
also a good predictor of production at that more aggregate level.
45land that is suitable for either rice or wheat within each county.79 Because the GAEZ data uses
an administrative map from 2000, changes in administrative boundaries between 1990 and 2000
causes approximately 20% of counties from the 1990 Population Census to not have matches
in the GAEZ data. To investigate whether this could bias our estimates, we examine whether
being unmatched is correlated with famine severity (as measured by the ratio of the famine birth
cohort size to pre-famine birth cohort size). We ﬁnd no correlation (near zero in magnitude and
statistically insigniﬁcant) and conclude that this should not aﬀect our analysis.
Historical Weather Data
For each county, we are able to observe the weather variables reported by the nearest station.
In our interviews with Chinese farmers, they reported that the most important determinant of
a good harvest was precipitation during the Spring months. Using county level production data
from the 1997 Agricultural Census (the only year that county-level production data is available
nationwide), we verify that spring precipitation is highly positively correlated with production
(per hectare of land sown). Therefore, we use average rainfall during the months of February,
March and April at the weather station in a county as our proxy for production each year. The
sample of counties for which we have historical weather data is small because initially, there were
every few stations. During 1949-66, there are 73 stations, only 24 of which existed in 1949.
Calculation of Caloric Needs
We estimate the average body weight of each age-sex group from physical examination data from
rural households from the China Health and Nutritional Survey 1989. We assume that all adults
age 21-50 perform a high level of physical activity, and those age 51-100 perform a medium level
of physical activity. Caloric needs for staying alive in Panel B are estimated to be 43% of what is
needed for working and healthy child development. This is projected from the assumption that
an adult male laborer needs approximately 900 calories to stay alive, which is approximately
43% of the requirement for heavy physical labor. See Dasgupta and Ray (1986) for a discussion
of caloric needs. Our calculation shows that the average population caloric need for productive
agricultural laborers (or for normal child development) is 1,870.7 calories per day and that the
average need to stay alive is approximately 804.4 calories per day (see Appendix Table A2).
Appendix Table A4 lists the provinces in ascending order of mortality rate in 1960 (which
captures deaths in the 1960 winter following procurement in the fall of 1959). Columns (1) and
(2) show mortality rates in 1960 and production in 1959. In Columns (3) and (4), we calculate
grain production that was in surplus of the two benchmarks used in the previous section. We
ﬁnd that all provinces produced more than what was needed to avoid mortality, and only four
79Nunn and Qian (2010) provide a detailed description of the construction of this data and how to calculate
suitability measures at the regional level from this data. We follow their method. Appendix Figures A1A and
A1B present maps that overlay county-level boundaries with the grid-level suitability measures for rice and wheat,
respectively.
46provinces, three of which are the primarily urban province-level municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing,
and Tianjin), produced less than what was needed for a healthy labor force and normal child
development.80
Theory Appendix
Proofs of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
An equal distribution of consumption maximizes (8) but cannot be achieved given constraint (6)
and (7) by Assumption 2 which proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Consider two regions k and
l with b ek >b el. If tk tl, then ck(s)>cl(s) for s=fH;Lg by Assumption 1, but given the concavity
of p(), this violates (9), which proves the second part of the proposition. If ck(L) > cl(L), then
by (6) and Assumption 2, this implies that ck(H) > cl(H) which violates (9). Therefore, ck(L) <
cl(L) and satisfaction of (9) implies that ck(H) > cl(H), and this proves the third part of the
proposition. To prove the corollary, note that Var(p(ci(s))) = m(1 m)[p(ci(H)) p(ci(L))]
2.
Since ci(H) is rising in b ei and ci(L) is declining in b ei, p(ci(H)) p(ci(L)) is rising in b ei, which
implies that Var(p(ci(s))) is rising in b ei. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2



















and if i 2 fM+1;M+Ng, then
































80The fourth is Hainan, for which we do not have data on 1959 mortality rates.
47Under ﬁxed prices, (10) and the resource constraint of the economy implied by the substitution
































































(13) exceeds (14) if and only if condition (11) holds. Q.E.D.
Stylized Example of Model
It is straightforward to see the implications of the model as m, the probability of a drop in
production, approaches zero. This would be the case for instance if the drop in production
happens with suﬃciently low probability that it is eﬀectively ignored by the government, an
approximation which may not be unreasonable in the case of the Great Famine since the drop in
per capita production experienced in 1959 was very large by historical standards. In this case,
the model predicts that ci(H) is equalized across households so that the level of procurement
satisﬁes ti = b ei  c for c = e q=å
M+N




j=1 pj. In other words, the
government procures the diﬀerence between expected per capita production of a region and
average per capita consumption in the economy, where this consumption level is determined
by the diﬀerence between total per capita production and the per capita procurement target.
Moreover, this implies that the consumption of region i in the event of an unexpected decline
in production satisﬁes ci(L) = c si. So for example, suppose per capita production across all
regions is 20% lower than expected (i.e., si = :2b ei) and region i produces twice as much per
capita relative to the society as a whole (i.e., b ei = 2e). Moreover, let q = :2eå
M+N
j=1 pj so that the
government designate 20% of grain production from the economy in normal times for non-food
use. In this case, per capita consumption in region i actually declines by 50% and equals only
about 50% of national per capita production in the downturn.81 In sum, the combination of an
inﬂexible policy, a large unexpected drop in production, and a high aggregate procurement target
can together signiﬁcantly amplify the mortality consequence of a drop in per capita production.
81Given the procurement target, c=:8e so that region i’s consumption in the downturn equals (1 :4=:8)c=:4e.
48Dynamic Extension of Model
This dynamic extension of the model serves as a robustness check for the results of the static
model and it further illustrates how the positive and negative correlations between production
and mortality depend on actual production relative to anticipated production.
Let t = 0;::::;T represent time. Suppose that total per capita food production in region i in








where eit > 0 for i = f1;:::;Mg and eit = 0 for i = fM+1;:::;M+Ng. Every region has a baseline
productivity which ﬂuctuates over time, where all regions are subject to an aggregate proportional
shock to productivity. Let ht =

hL;hH	
correspond to the realization of the shock. ei 1 is given.
Let
cit = eit  tit (15)
the per capita consumption of households in region i at date t. tit R0 corresponds to procurement
and it is inﬂexible and must be chosen prior to the realization of the shock in period t. Suppose
that region i’s population at t prior to the realization of the shock is pit 1 and following the
realization of the shock is
pit = Np(cit)pit 1. (16)
Population following the shock at t is proportional to population prior to the shock, where the
proportion is increasing in consumption at t and in the exogenous population growth rate N > 0.
Intuitively, a larger fraction of the population survives if per capita consumption is higher. N
represents the underlying growth rate of the total population due to factors other than food




pit 1tit = 0. (17)
Suppose that the government values the life of an individual at t following the shock by btc,
where b 2 (0;1)is a discount factor and c > 0 represents the value of life. At every date t, the
government can condition its policy on ht = h0:::ht 1, which represents the history of shocks
experienced by the economy up to date t  1 which it has observed. Speciﬁcally, eit = hHhtei 1
with probability 1 m and eit = hLhtei 1 with probability m, which implies that the government
can form its expectation of eit based on information it has received from realized production up















49Given the complexity of the government’s problem, suppose for simplicity that p() satisﬁes
the following condition:82
p(c) = 1 exp( jc) for j > 0. (18)
One can achieve an analogous result as in Proposition 1 for this dynamic economy, where
the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and relies on arguments which utilize backward
induction.
Proposition 3 The policy of the government has the following features:
1. For every t, aggregate survival å
M+N
i=1 pit 1p(cit) conditional on fht;htg and fpit 1g
M+N
i=1 is
below that implied by an equal distribution of consumption at t,
2. Procurement tit is increasing in predicted productivity eit 1, and
3. Regional survival p(cit) is increasing in production eit if ht = hH, and regional survival
p(cit) is decreasing in production eit if ht = hL.
Proof. We establish these results by backward induction. The results for period t = T follow
from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1. Let cit (ht;ht) = eit (ht;ht) tit (ht), the
equilibrium value of consumption, and let










correspond to the expected continuation value associated with an individual in region i given
information prior to the date t shock. From (18), it follows that p0(c) = exp( jc) = 1 p(c).
Given (9) which holds at date T, it follows that ViT (hT) is the same across all i conditional on
hT. Now consider optimal policy at T  1 given that ViT (hT) is the same for all i. The analogous

















It is clear that an equal distribution of consumption cannot be achieved given constraint (15)
and the fact that eiT 1 varies proportionately across regions, and this establishes the ﬁrst
part of the proposition at T  1. Now consider two regions k and l with ekT 2 > elT 2. If
tkT 1  tlT 1, then ckT 1(hT 1;hT 1) > clT 1(hT 1;hT 1) for hT 1 =

hL;hH	
, but given the




















, and satisfaction of (19) implies that








, and this proves the third part of the proposition at T  1.
Finally, deﬁne ViT 1(hT 1) analogously to ViT (hT) so that it represents the continuation value to
an individual in region i at T  1 starting from history hT 1. It is straightforward to see given
(19) and the fact that p0(c) = 1 p(c) that ViT 1(hT 1) is equalized across i, so that backward
induction on this argument proves the results for all t.
This dynamic extension shows that our results generalize to a dynamic economy in which
the social planner values life of survivors for diﬀerent generations. Moreover, it shows that our
results critically depend not on the absolute level of production but on how the realized level
of production diﬀers from predicted production. This is highlighted by the fact that the sign
of the correlation between regional production and survival does not depend on the level of
total production, but on ht which represents how today’s production diﬀers from yesterday’s
production.
Note that our analysis presumes that the government knows the true value of ei 1 for each
region so that it is aware of each region’s capability. In practice, one can imagine that the
government instead has a noisy prior about the value of ei 1 and that it receives a noisy signal
of the realization of eit. In such an environment, the government knows ht and tries to predict
the value of eit given its expectation of the value of ei 1. As time passes, the government’s
expectation of eit becomes more and more accurate and the government asymptotically learns
the true value of ei 1. What can happen in such an environment is that an extremely optimistic
(and inaccurate) prior over the value of ei 1 together with extremely positive (and inaccurate)
initial signals regarding the values of eit can lead the government over-procure from rural regions
in earlier periods relative to later periods. This would clearly amplify the mortality consequences
of a drop in aggregate production. Details of such an extension are available upon request.
51Region A Region B City
Subsistence Needs  100 100 100
Production under High Shock (Probability 80%) 225 150 0
Production under Low Shock (Probability 20%) 180 120 0
Expected Production (0.8 x High + 0.2 x Low) 216 144 0
Expected Consumption  120 120 120
Procurement/Subsidy (Expected Production - Expected Consumption) 96 24 -120
Consumption under High Shock (High Production - Procurement) 129 126 120
Consumption under Low Shock (Low Production - Procurement) 84 96 120











A Ln Grain Prod x 1959 Dummy 0.119 0.256 0.242 0.237 0.262
(0.0432) (0.0482) (0.0436) (0.0370) (0.0485)
Robust SE (0.123) (0.0876) (0.0795) (0.0776) (0.0876)
B Ln Grain Prod -0.0182 -0.0619 -0.0929 -0.0523 -0.0731
(0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0178) (0.0353) (0.0205)
Robust SE (0.0205) (0.0237) (0.0174) (0.0192) (0.0412)
Ln Total Population 1.050 1.134 1.280 0.978 1.142
(0.0221) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0440) (0.0277)
Robust SE (0.0318) (0.0224) (0.0299) (0.0544) (0.0243)
Controls
Gov Exp on Public Goods N N Y N N
Province-Time Trends N N N Y N
Observations 1290 1055 1032 1055 968
R-squared 0.946 0.931 0.944 0.961 0.927
Joint A + B 0.101 0.194 0.149 0.185 0.189
p-value 0.0287 0.0001 0.0011 0.0002 0.0002
p-value (Robust) 0.419 0.0271 0.0641 0.0120 0.0315
Dependent Variable: Ln Number of Deaths in Year t+1
All regressions control for total province population and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
presented in italics. All regressions use a sample where Tibet, Hainan and Sichuan are excluded. In 
Columns (2)-(5), we also exclude all autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Neimeng and 
Qinghai.




















A Grain Suit x Born 1959-61 -0.289 -0.251 -0.224 -0.126 -0.0560 -0.0383 -0.0104 0.0152
(0.0495) (0.0507) (0.0513) (0.0458) (0.0414) (0.0427) (0.0432) (0.0405)
B Grain Suitability 0.0481 0.0418 0.0373 0.0210 0.00933 0.00638 0.00173 -0.00253
(0.00825) (0.00845) (0.00856) (0.00763) (0.00690) (0.00712) (0.00721) (0.00675)
Controls
Province Time Trends N N Y N N N Y N
Province FE * Year FE N N N Y N N N Y
Observations 21420 17622 17622 17622 12006 10368 10368 10368
Adjusted R-squared 0.904 0.907 0.910 0.925 0.873 0.873 0.877 0.881
Joint A + B -0.241 -0.209 -0.186 -0.105 -0.0466 -0.0319 -0.00865 0.0127
p-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00591 0.17700 0.37000 0.81100 0.70700
Agricultural Households Non Agricultural Households
Dependent Variable: Ln Birth Cohort Size
All regressions control for average log county birth cohort size and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. In 
Columns (2)-(4) and (5)-(8), we exclude all autonomous regions: Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Neimeng and Qinghai.













A Grain Suitability 0.0857
(0.0374)
B Grain Suit x Born 1959-61 -0.414
(0.282)
C Ln Mean Spring Precipitation 0.0186 0.0177 0.0170 0.0167
(0.00676) (0.00693) (0.00925) (0.00941)
D Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born 1959-61 -0.0960 -0.0884 -0.0825 -0.0775
(0.0299) (0.0309) (0.0418) (0.0412)
Controls
Ln Mean Spring Temperature  N N Y N Y
Ln Mean Spring Temperature x Born 1969-61 N N Y N Y
Observations 1454 1454 1423 673 652
Adjusted R-squared 0.909 0.909 0.910 0.894 0.897
Joint A+B (Column 1); Joint C+D (Columns 2-5) -0.328 -0.0774 -0.0707 -0.0655 -0.0608
p-value 0.201 0.00334 0.00983 0.0745 0.0902
Dependent Variable: Ln Cohort Size
All regressions control for average ln cohort size and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The regressions 
in columns (1)-(3) uses the full sample of counties and year for which we have weather data. In Columns (4) and (5), we restrict the 
sample to the counties that have weather data for at least 12 out of the 18 years of our sample.






   
   
   
   
   
   
   



































     
           































































































Non-Agric Figure 3: Aggregate Grain Production and Population Food Needs 
 











   
   
    
    
    
    












     
                
                         
                        
                  
               
                
                     
                 
                  
                                  
                                   
                                 
                       Figure 4A: Yearly Correlations Between Mortality and Grain Production and their 95% Confidence Intervals –  
The Coefficients of the interaction terms between grain production and year dummies controlling for total provincial population 
and year fixed effects. 
 
Source: Authors’ regression estimates. See Appendix Table A6. 
     
     
     
  
    
    
    
    
    

















































     
     
       
       
              
              Figure 4B: The Yearly Correlation between Birth Cohort Size and Suitability for Grain Production and their 95% Confidence Intervals – 
The coefficients of the interaction terms between suitability for grain production and year dummies controlling for average log county 


































Source: Authors’ regression estimates. See Appendix Table A7 column (1), 
        
        
        
        
        
       
       
       
       
       






























































           Figure 4C: The Yearly Correlations between Birth Cohort Size and Spring Precipitation and their 95% Confidence Intervals – 
The coefficients of the interaction terms between ln average spring precipitation and year dummies controlling for average log county 




Source: Authors’ regression estimates. See Appendix Table A7 column (2). 
 
 
     
      
     
      
  
     
    
     
    
































































     
     
       
       Obs Mean Std. Err.
Population (10,000 People) 1307 2938.39 54.11
Mortality Rate (per 1,000 People)  1307 8.58 0.12
Mortality Rate in 1960 (per 1,000 People)  1307 21.97 0.41
Mortality Rate in 1954-57 (per 1,000 People) 1307 11.55 0.06
Ratio of Mortality Rate 1960/Mortality Rate 1954-57 1307 1.84 0.03
Fraction of Provinces where the Ratio of Mortality Rate 1960/ Death Rate 1954-57>1 1307 0.86 0.01
Grain Production in 1959 (10,000 Tons) 1307 1009.29 23.69
Annual Per Capital Grain Production (Kg Per Person) 1307 317.79 3.42
Annual Per Capital Grain Production in 1959  (Kg Per Person) 1307 254.02 2.55
Annual Per Capital Grain Production in 1954-57  (Kg Per Person) 1307 305.41 2.37
Ratio of Per Capital Grain Production in 1959/1954-57 1307 0.83 0.00
Fraction of Provinces where the Ratio in Per Capita Grain Production 1959/1954-57>1 1307 0.96 0.01
Obs Mean Std. Err. Obs Mean Std. Err.
Average Cohort Size Born in 1949-66 (1%) 21420 52.66 47.86 12006 39.55 45.00
Average Famine Cohort Size born in 1959-61 (1%) 21420 35.08 29.49 12006 32.77 36.29
Average Pre-Famine Cohort Size born in1954-57 (1%) 21420 53.14 44.88 12006 40.92 44.72
Ratio of Famine 1959-61/Pre-Famine 1954-57 Cohort Size 21420 0.71 0.25 12006 0.83 0.30
Fraction of Counties where Ratio of Famine 1959-61/Pre-Famine 1954-57 Cohort Size <1 21420 0.89 0.31 12006 0.76 0.43
Fraction of Land Suitable for Rice or Wheat Cultivation 21420 0.13 0.24 12006 0.20 0.30
Sources: Panel A -- CSDM50 (1999), Panel B -- 1990 Population Census, GAEZ (2002)
APPENDIX Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Agricultural Households Non-Agricultural Households
B. Retrospective County-Birth Year Level Data (1949-66)
In Panel A, the sample contains 27 provinces. Tibet, Sichuan and Hainan are omitted. Each observation is at the province-year level. In Panel B, the sample contains all 30 provinces. 
Observations are at the birth year - county level.
A. Historical Province-Year Level Data 1949-98Age Bracket Population (100) Daily Caloric Needs Population Daily Caloric Need Average Daily Caloric Need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female
0-5 495,641 1,300 64,433,330,000
6-10 335,192 1,800 60,334,560,000
11-15 294,474 2,200 64,784,280,000
16-20 298,419 2,200 65,652,180,000
21-50 1,055,377 1,800 189,967,860,000
51-100 432,744 1,300 56,256,720,000
Male
0-5 542,455 1,300 70,519,150,000
6-10 373,404 1,800 67,212,720,000
11-15 347,053 2,500 86,763,250,000
16-20 343,704 3,000 103,111,200,000
21-50 1,165,685 2,100 244,793,850,000
51-100 387,607 1,600 62,017,120,000
Total 6,071,755.00 1,135,846,220,000 1,870.70
Female
0-5 495,641 559 27,706,331,900
6-10 335,192 774 25,943,860,800
11-15 294,474 946 27,857,240,400
16-20 298,419 946 28,230,437,400
21-50 1,055,377 774 81,686,179,800
51-100 432,744 559 24,190,389,600
Male
0-5 542,455 559 30,323,234,500
6-10 373,404 774 28,901,469,600
11-15 347,053 1,075 37,308,197,500
16-20 343,704 1,290 44,337,816,000
21-50 1,165,685 903 105,261,355,500
51-100 387,607 688 26,667,361,600
Total 6,071,755.00 488,413,874,600 804.40
Source: Coale (1981) and authors' computations.
Notes: Caloric requirements are calculated based on model from the USDA. In Panel A., for adults, we assume females 
21-50 weigh 120 lbs, females 51-100 weigh 100lbs. Males 21-50 weigh 140 lbs, and 51-100 weigh 120 lbs. We assume 
that all adults 21-50 perform a high level of physical activity. And those 51-100 perform a medium level of physical 
activity. Caloric needs for staying alive are estimated to be 43% of those in Panel A. This is projected from the 
observation that an adult male labor need approximately 900 calories to stay alive, which is approximately 43% of the 
requirement for heavy physical labor.
B. 1954 Caloric Needs for Avoiding Mortality
A. 1954 Caloric Needs for Heavy Agricultural Labor (or Healthy Child Development)
Table A2: Historic Population Structure and Caloric RequirementsGrain Prod Population Needed  Grain Surplus Needed  Grain Surplus
(Millions Tons) (10000) (Million Tons) (Million Tons) (Million Tons) (Million Tons)
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1949 65.03 42708.391 81 -16 35 30
1950 85.41 45820.5 87 -2 38 48
1951 90.89 46933.66 89 2 38 52
1952 108.91 48617.371 92 17 40 69
1953 102.17 50028.059 95 7 41 61
1954 148.80 52116.09 99 50 43 106
1955 163.39 53294.91 101 62 44 120
1956 165.03 54323.5 103 62 45 120
1957 158.24 55881.781 106 52 46 112
1958 169.04 57388.539 109 60 47 122
1959 147.58 58945.941 112 36 48 99
1960 126.87 58551.832 111 16 48 79
1961 122.14 58592.98 111 11 48 74
1962 136.77 59972.609 114 23 49 88
1963 145.58 61641.711 117 28 51 95
1964 165.03 62797.738 119 46 51 114
1965 185.57 64575.449 123 63 53 133
1966 196.03 66330.219 126 70 54 142
1967 199.94 67963.57 129 71 56 144
1968 192.56 69795.711 133 60 57 135
1969 192.56 71711.383 136 56 59 134
1970 223.11 73658.367 140 83 60 163
1971 236.66 75589.594 144 93 62 175
1972 227.55 77297.68 147 81 63 164
1973 253.36 79072.508 150 103 65 189
1974 262.31 80510.727 153 109 66 196
1975 274.85 81853.5 156 119 67 208
1976 274.66 83030.188 158 117 68 207
Source: CDSM50 (1999), CPIRC (2000) and authors' computations.
190 kg/person, 1870 Calories 82 kg/person,804 Calories
National Production and Retention Over Time
Notes: Total production reported in column (1) is aggregate from province level production. The sample contains 27 provinces 
(Sichuan, Hainan and Tibet are omitted). Surplus in Columns (4) and (6) refer to production that is excess of subsistence 
needs. Average caloric needs in Columns (3) and (5) are computed using the national age distribution of population from the 
1954 Census (see Coale, 1981). See Table A2. Based on estimates provided by the Ministry of Health and Hygiene of China, 
we assume that 1 kg of grain provides 3,587 calories.
Table A3: Grain Production and Population Caloric Requirements Over TimeProvince 1960 Death Rate 1959 Grain Prod
Kg/Person 1,870 Calories 804  Calories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shanghai 6.9 107.02 -82.98 36.02
Beijing 9.14 82.01 -107.99 11.01
Neimeng 9.4 412.16 222.16 341.16
Jilin 10.13 401.07 211.07 330.07
Tianjin 10.34 91.42 -98.58 20.42
Heilongjiang 10.52 505.95 315.95 434.95
Shanxi 11.21 244.48 54.48 173.48
Liaoning 11.5 235.91 45.91 164.91
Zhejiang 11.88 382.06 192.06 311.06
Shan'xi 12.27 251.99 61.99 180.99
Ningxia 13.9 303.70 113.70 232.70
Guangdong 15.24 242.70 52.70 171.70
Xinjiang 15.67 304.35 114.35 233.35
Hebei 15.8 195.12 5.12 124.12
Jiangxi 16.06 314.36 124.36 243.36
Jiangshu 18.41 231.42 41.42 160.42
Fujian 20.7 259.23 69.23 188.23
Hubei 21.21 241.07 51.07 170.07
Shandong 23.6 195.24 5.24 124.24
Yunnan 26.26 265.26 75.26 194.26
Hunan 29.42 300.32 110.32 229.32
Guangxi 29.46 246.98 56.98 175.98
Henan 39.56 195.72 5.72 124.72
Qinghai 40.73 200.49 10.49 129.49
Gansu 41.32 223.95 33.95 152.95
Guizhou 52.33 242.67 52.67 171.67
Anhui 68.58 204.55 14.55 133.55
Hainan N/A 181.51 -8.49 110.51
Tibet N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sichuan N/A N/A N/A N/A
Famine Mortality and Production by Province
1959 "Surplus" 
Notes: "Surplus" in Columns (3) and (4) refer to production that is excess of what is needed to work 
(for children, this refers to normal child development), and the excess of what is needed to stay alive. 
Average caloric needs in Columns (3) and (4) are computed using the national age distribution of 
population from the 1954 Census (see Coale, 1981). See Table A2. The three italicized provinces 
(Hainan, Tibet and Sichuan) are excluded from the computation of national production and caloric 
needs and all regression analsysis.
Source: CSDM50 (1999) and authors' computations.
Table A4: 1959 Regional Grain Production and Population Caloric Requirements(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full 
Sample Omit Autonomous Omit Autonomous Omit Autonomous
Omit Autonomous 
and 1949-53
A Ln Grain Prod x 1959 Dummy 0.110 0.239 0.226 0.209 0.245
(0.0458) (0.0505) (0.0468) (0.0391) (0.0511)
Robust SE (0.113) (0.0838) (0.0762) (0.0721) (0.0838)
B Ln Grain Prod 0.0337 -0.0299 -0.0581 -0.0416 -0.0388
(0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0373) (0.0217)
Robust SE (0.0432) (0.0301) (0.0369) (0.0434) (0.0343)
Ln Total Population 0.982 1.084 1.220 0.748 1.090
(0.0234) (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0465) (0.0292)
Robust SE (0.0556) (0.0472) (0.0667) (0.169) (0.0545)
Controls
Gov Exp on Public Goods N N Y N N
Province-Time Trends N N N Y N
Observations 1290 1055 1032 1055 968
R-squared 0.938 0.923 0.935 0.955 0.918
Joint A + B 0.144 0.209 0.168 0.168 0.206
p-value 0.00316 7.44e-05 0.000640 0.00144 0.000129
p-value (Robust) 0.231 0.0174 0.0463 0.0174 0.0214
Dependent Variable: Ln Number of Deaths in Year t+1
All regressions control for total province population and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in italics. All 
regressions use a sample where Tibet, Hainan and Sichuan are excluded. In Columns (2)-(5), we also exclude all autonomous 
regions: Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Neimeng and Qinghai.
Table A5: The Correlation between Suitability for Grain Production and Birth Cohort Size -- Alternative Normalization Method(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient SE Robust SE
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1949 -0.0396 (0.0515) (0.0423)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1950 -0.0720 (0.0554) (0.0458)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1951 0.0129 (0.0575) (0.0347)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1952 0.0210 (0.0542) (0.0371)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1953 0.0793 (0.0528) (0.0432)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1954 0.0127 (0.0494) (0.0311)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1955 0.0563 (0.0513) (0.0388)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1956 -0.0211 (0.0522) (0.0504)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1957 -0.0032 (0.0546) (0.0695)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1958 0.0537 (0.0497) (0.0425)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1959 0.2030 (0.0502) (0.0900)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1960 -0.0195 (0.0509) (0.0528)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1961 -0.0005 (0.0529) (0.0335)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1962 -0.0125 (0.0518) (0.0442)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1963 0.0112 (0.0556) (0.0712)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1964 0.0255 (0.0550) (0.0581)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1965 -0.0306 (0.0585) (0.0655)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1966 0.0256 (0.0531) (0.0544)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1967 -0.0479 (0.0552) (0.0516)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1968 -0.0977 (0.0564) (0.0614)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1969 -0.0466 (0.0552) (0.0402)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1970 -0.0484 (0.0568) (0.0451)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1971 -0.0800 (0.0555) (0.0456)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1972 -0.0539 (0.0510) (0.0346)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1973 -0.0612 (0.0532) (0.0348)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1974 -0.0931 (0.0566) (0.0394)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1975 -0.1350 (0.0556) (0.0597)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1976 -0.0715 (0.0536) (0.0259)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1977 -0.0932 (0.0518) (0.0244)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1978 -0.0921 (0.0535) (0.0274)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1979 -0.0888 (0.0525) (0.0273)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1980 -0.0907 (0.0526) (0.0251)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1981 -0.0831 (0.0497) (0.0274)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1982 -0.0633 (0.0501) (0.0374)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1983 -0.0627 (0.0478) (0.0280)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1984 -0.0792 (0.0490) (0.0259)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1985 -0.0580 (0.0492) (0.0239)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1986 -0.0780 (0.0493) (0.0313)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1987 -0.0807 (0.0493) (0.0281)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1988 -0.1020 (0.0501) (0.0267)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1989 -0.0684 (0.0504) (0.0237)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1990 -0.0726 (0.0505) (0.0291)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1991 -0.0855 (0.0523) (0.0272)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1992 -0.1050 (0.0514) (0.0279)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1993 -0.0966 (0.0505) (0.0260)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1994 -0.0967 (0.0496) (0.0279)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1995 -0.1050 (0.0492) (0.0243)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1996 -0.0942 (0.0488) (0.0258)
Ln Grain Prod x Year = 1997 -0.1180 (0.0486) (0.0237)
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable: Ln Mortality
All regressions control for year fixed effects. Column (2) presents unadjusted standard errors. Column (3) 
presents robust standard errors. The sample excludes Tibet, Sichuan and Hainan, and  all autonomous 
regions: Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Neimeng and Qinghai.
Table A6: Yearly Correlation between Per Capita Production and Mortality Rates
1055
0.935(1) (2)






Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1949 0.0786
(0.0341)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1950 0.0420
(0.0349)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1951 0.208 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1951 0.00615
(0.0319) (0.0817)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1952 0.188 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1952 0.0345
(0.0312) (0.0426)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1953 0.181 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1953 0.0841
(0.0288) (0.0344)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1954 0.144 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1954 0.0122
(0.0256) (0.0218)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1955 -0.00454 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1955 0.00749
(0.0273) (0.0297)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1956 0.0971 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1956 0.0565
(0.0272) (0.0152)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1957 0.0439 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1957 0.0331
(0.0251) (0.0198)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1958 -0.0934 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1958 0.00527
(0.0386) (0.0314)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1959 -0.233 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1959 -0.0472
(0.0516) (0.0325)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1960 -0.292 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1960 -0.0871
(0.0651) (0.0467)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1961 -0.101 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1961 -0.0934
(0.0502) (0.0349)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1962 -0.0450 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1962 -0.0151
(0.0339) (0.0163)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1963 0.0438 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1963 0.0505
(0.0278) (0.0227)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1964 -0.0736 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1964 0.0477
(0.0309) (0.0345)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1965 -0.0669 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1965 -0.000498
(0.0293) (0.0240)
Ln Grain Suitability x Born Year 1966 -0.117 Ln Mean Spring Precipitation x Born Year 1966 -0.0177
(0.0429) (0.0306)
Observations 17622 Observations 1443
R-squared 0.908 R-squared 0.911
F-Stat Grain Suitability x 1959 and Grain Suitability x 1960 12.84 F-Stat Ln MSPx1959 and Ln MSPx1960 2.292
p-val 0.000 p-val 0.1025
All regressions control for average ln county birth cohort size and birth year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the county level. In 
columns (1),  all autonomous regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Guanxi, Ningxia and Neimeng) are omitted. Column (2) uses a subsample of all 
the county-level data for which we have weather data for. Birth cohorts from 1949 and 1950 are omitted from regression three because there 
are very few weather stations during these years.
Dependent Variable: Ln Cohort Size
Table A7: The Yearly Correlations between Suitability for Grain Production and Birth Cohort Size, and Weather and Birth Cohort SizeProduction 
(Millions Tons)
Annual 
Growth Rate Growth Rate 4MA (kg/agric laborer) (Millions Tons)
% of 
Production
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1952 164 260 33 20.12%
1953 167 0.02 242 47 28.14%
1954 170 0.02 228 51 30.00%
1955 184 0.08 256 48 26.09%
1956 193 0.05 0.04 284 40 20.73%
1957 195 0.01 0.04 273 46 23.59%
1958 200 0.03 0.04 268 52 26.00%
1959 170 -0.15 -0.02 193 64 37.65%
1960 143 -0.16 -0.07 182 47 32.87%
1961 148 0.03 -0.06 209 37 25.00%
1962 160 0.08 -0.05 229 32 20.00%
1963 170 0.06 0.00 231 37 21.76%
1964 188 0.11 0.07 256 40 21.28%
1965 195 0.04 0.07 261 39 20.00%
1966 214 0.10 0.08 282 41 19.16%
1967 218 0.02 0.06 281 41 18.81%
1968 209 -0.04 0.03 261 40 19.14%
1969 211 0.01 0.02 259 38 18.01%
1970 240 0.14 0.03 282 46 19.17%
1971 250 0.04 0.04 293 44 17.60%
1972 241 -0.04 0.04 298 39 16.18%
1973 265 0.10 0.06 293 48 18.11%
1974 275 0.04 0.04 303 47 17.09%
1975 285 0.04 0.03 304 53 18.60%
1976 286 0.00 0.04 306 49 17.13%
Source:  Li and Yang (2005); Original Sources: Ministry of Agriculture (1989). Sample of 24 provinces.
Retained Grain Grain Prod Grain Procurement  
Table A8: Historical Production and Procurement from Li and Yang (2005)(1) (2) (3)
Baseline
A Ln Grain Prod x 1959 Dummy 0.256 0.276 0.321
(0.0876) (0.0679) (0.0594)
B Ln Grain Prod x 1959 Dummy -0.0619 -0.0264 -0.0295
(0.0174) (0.0157) (0.0152)
C Ln Urban Population x 1959 Dummy -0.327
(0.254)
D Ln Urban Population -0.251 -0.246
(0.0136) (0.0129)
Observations 1055 1043 1043
R-squared 0.931 0.953 0.953
Joint A+B 0.194 0.249 0.291
p-value 0.0271 0.0002 0.0000
Joint C-D -0.0813
p-value 0.750
Dependent Variable: Ln Number of Deaths in Year t+1
All regressions control for total province population and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. All regressions use a sample where the autonomous regions -- Tibet, Xinjiang, 
Guangxi, Ningxia, Neimeng and Qinghai -- are excluded.







































































Figure A2B: Birth Cohort Size Over Time by Province 
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Graphs by ProvinceFigure A3: Histogram of Famine Intensity Across Counties 
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Average 1959-61 Cohort Size/ Average 1954-57 Cohort Size (Agric)Figure A4: The Correlation between Province Per Capita Grain Procurement Targets and a 4 Year Moving Average of 
Past Per Capita Production 1980-88 
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Ln 4 Year MA of Past Per Capita Production
coef = 1.9701186, se = .1487255, t = 13.25